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PUTTING ETHICS TO THE (NATIONAL
STANDARDIZED) TEST: TRACING THE
ORIGINS OF THE MPRE
Paul T. Hayden*
INTRODUCTION
On March 14, 1980, 4,208 bar applicants from six states, sitting in
thirty-three different test locations in sixteen different states, took an
identical two-hour examination on the subject of lawyers' professional
responsibility.1  The Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam
("MPRE"), a multiple-choice exam whose passage was required for
bar admission in those six states, had arrived.2 It was clearly a test
whose time had come. After the first exam session, states began
rapidly to jump aboard the MPRE bandwagon. The number of
applicants taking the exam nearly doubled from 1980 to 1981. In
2001, over 56,000 applicants sat for the exam.' Today, passing the
MPRE is required for admission to the bar in all but three states:
Maryland, Washington and Wisconsin.' In the span of two decades,
we have thus seen the flowering of a remarkable phenomenon: the
establishment of a national bar examination on legal ethics in a
country in which the states purportedly control bar admission. At the
time, the birth of the MPRE undoubtedly seemed to most an
insignificant blip on the historical screen.6 In hindsight, however, it
was anything but that.
* Professor of Law and Jacob J. Becker Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles;
B.A., Yale (1979); J.D., UCLA School of Law (1984); successful MPRE examinee
(1983) and member of the State Bar of California (1984 to present). Thanks to Diane
L. Hayden for her careful reading and insightful suggestions. Further thanks to
Loyola Law School of Loyola Marymount University and to Dean David W.
Burcham for generous financial support.
1. Letter from the Chair, 59:2 Bar Examiner 2, 2 (1990); Letter from the
Chairman, 49 Bar Examiner 44 (1980).
2. The six states were California, Minnesota, Kansas, South Carolina, New
Hampshire, and Wyoming. Letter from the Chairman, 49 Bar Examiner 43, 44
(1980).
3. MPRE Statistics, 71:2 Bar Examiner 22 (2002).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 21. The MPRE is also used in the District of Columbia, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, and the Virgin Islands. Id.
6. Naturally, it did not seem insignificant to those who produced it. The
chairman of the National Conference of Bar Examiners predicted that "the fiscal year
1979-1980 will find the Conference involved in the most ambitious and far reaching
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The MPRE's immediate success surprised even its most fervent
backers. When discussion of the MPRE began in 1976 at the National
Conference of Bar Examiners ("NCBE"), bar-exam testing on legal
ethics was on the wane in a number of states, primarily "because the
reliability factor in ethics examinations was dubious."' 7 Not only were
essay questions difficult to grade with consistency, but essays on ethics
often allowed even the scoundrels to slide by with empty platitudes.
The NCBE had modest goals for the test, and equally modest
predictions for its ultimate expansion: "Even the most optimistic
agreed that fifteen jurisdictions were the most that would ever
participate."' While bar examiners have expressed joy that the test has
greatly exceeded those expectations, other segments of the bar have
been far less fulsome with praise. Most law professors appear to
regard the exam at best as a tolerable embarrassment unworthy of
much attention. What little commentary that has been offered from
that quarter has been uniformly and fundamentally negative. 9 One
might say that among legal academics the overall reaction to the test
has been one of hostile indifference. Beyond the Ivory Tower, some
leaders of the organized bar have leveled weighty complaints about
the test's limitations and negative effects. The influential 1992
MacCrate Report signals its agreement with the view that the exam
actually discourages instruction in "professional values" and causes
legal educators to overemphasize narrow regulatory provisions at the
program in its history," making reference mainly to the upcoming MPRE. Letter
from the Chairman, 48 Bar Examiner 127,127 (1979).
7. Frank Morrissey, The MPRE: Ten Years Old and Exceeding Expectations, 59:2
Bar Examiner 4,4 (1990). See infra notes 178-86 and accompanying text.
8. Morrisey, supra note 7, at 4.
9. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment
in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 145, 171 (1996) ("Because
most law students must take this test, many of them approach their required ethics
course with tunnel vision-viewing it as preparation for the MPRE."); Mary C. Daly,
Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, Contextualizing Professional Responsibility: A
New Curriculum for a New Century, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 193, 195-96 (1996)
(pointing to the MPRE's negative effect on student attitudes about the subject matter
and complaining that "[i]ts multiple-choice format sends the misguided message that
ethical dilemmas are capable of clear, correct resolution"); Bruce A. Hake, "Attorney
Misconduct"-A Rebuttal, 4 Geo. Immigr. L. J. 727, 727-28 (1990) (recounting joke
about how to pass the MPRE, whose punch line is that the best answer is "the one
that would make the most money for the legal profession if followed by all lawyers");
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42. J. Legal Educ. 31, 40-41
(1992) (criticizing the MPRE for, among other things, "trivializ[ing] the subject
matter" and undermining legal educators' attempts to treat ethics issues seriously)
[hereinafter Rhode, Pervasive Method]; William H. Simon, "Thinking Like a Lawyer"
About Ethical Questions, 27 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 11 (1998) ("[T]he conception of lawyer
judgment we find in conventional legal ethics is particularly deviant. At worst, as in
the [MPRE], we find a conception that takes 'thinking like a lawyer' to mean not
thinking at all."); see also Maureen Straub Kordesh, Reinterpreting ABA Standard
302(f) in Light of the Multistate Performance Test, 30 U. Mem. L. Rev. 299, 310 (2000)
(criticizing all multiple-choice bar exams on the ground that "lawyers do not practice
in a multiple-choice world").
1300 [Vol. 71
ORIGINS OF THE MPRE
expense of dealing with more meaningful ethical concepts.1" Even
some judges have been outspoken critics."
With such assessments from key constituencies, why did the MPRE
happen in the first place, and why has it thrived? The answer is that
several strong historical forces coalesced in the late 1970s to propel
the MPRE's initial development, and continue today to sustain it. It
did not spring forth fully formed from the head of Zeus, or Watergate,
either. While the Watergate scandal of 1973-74 cannot be dismissed
as irrelevant to any ethics reform of the late 1970s, 2 its influence on
the creation of the MPRE is easy to overstate. 3 The MPRE's
10. ABA Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Report of the
Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, Legal Education
and Professional Development-An Educational Continuum 283 (1992) [hereinafter
MacCrate Report].
11. Reportedly, Florida Supreme Court Chief Justice Rosemary Barkett once
"publicly ridiculed the MPRE and called for its abolition." Robert M. Jarvis, An
Anecdotal History of the Bar Exam, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 359, 385 (1996).
12. Watergate sent strong shock waves through the legal profession, especially
with respect to legal ethics. While the scandal was a momentous historical event,
culminating in the only resignation of a President of the United States, it actually
"raised no challenging issues of professional responsibility. The lawyer conduct in
Watergate that shocked the nation-burglary and obstruction of justice-was
indefensible and, for the most part, undefended." Simon, supra note 9, at 1. Public
perception was largely otherwise, however. As one contemporaneous observer put it,
"with the advent of new scandals in Washington,... our stock has sunk to what is,
perhaps, its lowest point in the past twenty years." Burton R. Laub, Law-A Bad
Trade but a Noble Profession, 42 Bar Examiner 156, 157 (1973). Of course,
dissatisfaction with lawyers is a "chronic grievance" that does not turn on any
particular scandal of the day. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100
Yale L.J. 1239, 1239 (1991). Today, only 19 percent of the American public has
confidence in lawyers, according to an ABA survey. Robert A. Clifford, Now More
Than Ever, 28:3 Litigation 1, 74 (2002). Interestingly, at least one survey at the time
of Watergate showed that the scandal did not have any negative impact on the
percentage of people who regarded law as a preferred occupation for themselves. See
Law as a Career, 60 A.B.A. J. 315, 315, 318 (1974) (recognizing that the survey shows
that "things might not be as bad as supposed"); see also Watergate-A Lawyers'
Scandal?, 60 A.B.A. J. 1257 (1974) (arguing that Watergate should be regarded more
as a source of pride than shame for lawyers, given the greater number of heroic
lawyers involved in its clean-up).
13. See, e.g., John D. Ayer, The Last Butskellite, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1805, 1809
(1995) (reviewing James B. White, Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in Literature,
Law and Politics (1994)) ("[I]n the undertow of the Watergate scandal.., the legal
education establishment started slapping 'ethics' requirements on just about
everything: the law curriculum, the bar exam, the continuing education agenda, and
so forth."); Philip C. Kissam, Lurching Towards the Millennium: The Law School, the
Research University, and the Professional Reforms of Legal Education, 60 Ohio St.
L.J. 1965, 1984 (1999) ("[T]he Watergate affair aroused public and professional
concerns about the ethical behavior of lawyers, and the profession responded by
establishing a professional ethics part to state bar examinations and by requiring law
schools to teach 'legal ethics."'); Rhode, Pervasive Method, supra note 9, at 39-41
(stating that "the primary impetus for ethics instruction was Watergate," and noting
"[i]n the wake of Watergate, states began requiring more examination on professional
responsibility issues, and most eventually moved to the multistate multiple-choice
format").
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creation was the logical result of an historical progression of events in
three related areas of law: the drafting of the ethics rules; the
evolution of bar examinations; and changes in law school
accreditation standards. In each of these three areas, there was a
longstanding and pronounced trend towards greater national
standardization. In the late 1970s currents in all three areas flowed
together to produce the first national standardized test in legal ethics.
While we may never get a fully "national" bar exam or "national" bar
governed by "national" ethics standards-and I offer no argument on
the merits one way or the other here' 4-the launching of the MPRE
was certainly a remarkable and genuine step in that direction. 5
I make no attempt here to provide a substantive critique of the
current MPRE as a testing tool. Nor do I join the largely one-sided
debate over the exam's effects on the teaching of legal ethics. 6
Rather, by tracing the major currents that fed the test's development,
some of which go back a century, I offer something of a reassessment
of its significance in the grander scheme of things. Only by seeing the
MPRE in its proper context, as a product of a powerful movement
towards national standardization that was occurring in three different
areas of the lawyers' world, can we hope to understand how it came to
be and why it continues to roll along.
Part I of this article provides a brief descriptive overview of the
exam itself. Part II discusses how the development of the MPRE was
influenced by the evolution of legal ethics rules from vague platitude
to nationally-standardized black letter. Part III places the MPRE in
the larger context of bar examinations, as they evolved from oral
exams to written exams to objective exams national in scope. Part IV
explores the influence on the MPRE's creation of changes in national
accreditation standards for law schools.
I. A DESCRIPTION OF THE MPRE AND ITS PURPOSES
The MPRE is a 125-minute standardized test, administered three
times a year, containing 50 multiple choice questions dealing with
lawyers' professional conduct. 7 Except for Florida, all of the states
that require the MPRE allow law students to take the exam while still
in school.' Each question provides a fact pattern, followed by a
14. See infra Part III.C.
15. See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, The MPRE Reconsidered, 86 Ky. L.J. 395, 396 (1998)
(calling the MPRE "virtually a national admission test for lawyers"); David A. Logan,
Upping the Ante: Curricular and Bar Exam Reform in Professional Responsibility, 56
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1023, 1029 (1999) (criticizing the MPRE as being "flawed
because of its very nature as a national test" because it ignores jurisdictional
variations in the standards for professional responsibility).
16. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
17. Nat'l Conference of Bar Exam'rs, 2002 MPRE Information Booklet, at 3, 30
[hereinafter 2002 MPRE Booklet].
18. See Daly et al., supra note 9, at 196 n.9.
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specific question and four possible answers. 9 The examinee, of
course, is instructed to "pick the best answer. ' 2 The purpose of the
test, according to the NCBE, the organization that developed and
administers it with the assistance of the American College Testing
Service, 21 "is to measure the examinee's knowledge and understanding
of established standards related to a lawyer's professional conduct.
2
Questions are currently based on "the law governing the conduct of
lawyers," as found in the American Bar Association ("ABA") Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, and "controlling constitutional decisions and generally
accepted principles established in leading federal and state cases and
in procedural and evidentiary rules. 213 As the most recent MPRE
Information Booklet explains in more detail, questions dealing with
the discipline of lawyers are governed by the Model Rules, while
questions beyond that context
are designed to measure an understanding of the generally accepted
rules, principles, and common law regulating the legal profession in
the United States; in these items, the correct answer will be
governed by the view reflected in a majority of cases, statutes, or
regulations on the subject. To the extent that questions of
professional responsibility arise in the context of procedural or
evidentiary issues, such as the availability of litigation sanctions or
the scope of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence will be
assumed to apply, unless otherwise stated.24
The MPRE's current coverage, which first took effect in March,
1999 after years of study,25 is broader than in prior exam incarnations.
The NCBE's advice to students preparing for the current test includes
the suggestion that they consult not only the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, but also the ALI's Restatement of the Law
19. 2002 MPRE Booklet, supra note 17, at 31.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Id. at 30. While the exam's coverage has changed somewhat over the years, its
purpose has remained largely the same. The NCBE Board of Managers approved this
statement of purpose for the first MPRE:
To require that all persons admitted to practice law be well aware of the
ethical standards of the legal profession. The purpose would[] be ... to
insure that they study and be prepared to cope with the ethical problems of
the legal profession. It would not be a test to determine one's ethical
standards and it should be no reproach to anyone who fails. It would only
mean a lack of knowledge of the established standards.
Letter from the Chairman, supra note 6, at 128.
23. 2002 MPRE Booklet, supra note 17, at 30-31.
24. Id. at 31. In accordance with this broader coverage, any particular session of
the MPRE may now contain questions not only about discipline or the propriety of
hypothetical conduct under the rules, but also about litigation sanctions,
disqualification, and civil and criminal liability. Id. at 32.
25. Id. at 3.
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Governing Lawyers,26 promulgated in May, 1998. When the test was
first administered in 1980, its questions covered only issues raised by
the text of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.2 7 Soon after the ABA launched the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 1983, the MPRE's coverage
changed, as well: while the Code of Judicial Conduct remained fair
game, applicants were asked also about issues raised by both the
Model Code and the Model Rules-although there was no testing on
areas in which the Model Code and the Model Rules diverged.2" The
recent broadening of the test's coverage has by any measure improved
it,29 but perhaps predictably has done little to assuage most critics."'
Passing the MPRE is required for admission to the bar in all but a
few states." Whether the institution of the bar examination itself is
necessary or even useful is constantly debated, although the serious
wrangling occurred more in the past than it does today. 2 Several
rationales for the bar exam have been asserted over the years.
Perhaps the most common is that the bar examination helps insure
that only those competent to practice law obtain a license do so, which
protects future clients from harm at the hands of the unqualified. As
the lead paragraph in the premiere issue of The Bar Examiner
explains,
The bar examiners as an agency of the state represent the interests
both of the practicing lawyers and the public. It is their duty not
only to see that those candidates who are admitted measure up to
26. Id. at 35.
27. See Letter from the Chairman, supra note 6, at 128; Multistate Professional
Responsibility Examination, 50:1 Bar Examiner 21, 23 (1981) (remarks of Joe
Covington) (describing the drafting process in detail); Id. at 25-28 (remarks of Eugene
L. Smith) (same).
28. See Cynthia Board Schmeiser, A Ten-Year Profile of the Administration of the
MPRE Program, 59:2 Bar Examiner 6, 11, 54-55 (1990).
29. This is not to suggest that the former incarnations contained poorly-framed
questions, only that their coverage was quite narrow. The MPRE is developed by a
six-member committee made up of experts in professional responsibility, and each
question is thoroughly vetted by additional experts before its inclusion in the test.
Even after the test is given, experts review the statistical performance of each
question before computing the final scores. 2002 MPRE Booklet, supra note 17, at 30.
30. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 15, at 409-11 (criticizing most aspects of the test
even after recent revisions in coverage); Logan, supra note 15, at 1028-30 & n.29
(opining that broader coverage is better, while still criticizing the test on many
grounds).
31. The MPRE is graded separately from the rest of the bar exam in alljurisdictions that use it. An applicant must therefore achieve a passing score on the
MPRE alone, regardless of his or her performance on the rest of the bar exam, in
order to gain admittance to practice.
32. The key arguments on both sides are found in two articles by giants of the
profession: Leon Green, Why Bar Examinations?, 33 Nw. U. Ill. L. Rev. 908 (1939),
and Erwin N. Griswold, In Praise of Bar Examinations, 60 A.B.A. J. 81 (1974).
33. See, e.g., Michael J. Thomas, The American Lawyer's Next Hurdle: The State-
Based Bar Examination System, 24 J. Legal Prof. 235,240 (2000).
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the general standards of the bar, but also that they meet the
independent standard of what the public has a right to expect of a
lawyer.34
Another frequently-voiced justification for the bar exam is that it
holds law schools accountable for the quality of their programs and
their students.35 It not only provides an "outside source of checks on
the law schools," but also "serve[s] to stimulate law schools to
maintain high standards of legal education."36 As one bar official said
in 1959,
[1]f you find in a certain law school that no one in the bottom 25 per
cent passed the examination, while in other law schools the
percentage was much higher, it is a pretty definite indication that
that particular law school is graduating applicants who should not be
graduated.... The primary purpose of the bar examiners... is to
conduct an objective examination that will determine whether the
law schools are doing their job properly and whether they are
maintaining adequate standards.
37
In short, the bar exam is thought to provide a standardized measure
of the competence of both the applicant and the institution from
which the applicant received his degree. As a member of the Ohio
Board of Bar Examiners said four decades ago, "I know that bar
examination results are not sure-fire proof of the quality of
preparation of applicants taking the examinations. They are,
however, the only standardized and demonstrable proof available."3
The MPRE rests on similar, although not identical, justifications. It
is thought to be a test of competence with respect to legal ethics, but
within a limited scope. The NCBE asserts that "the MPRE is not a
test designed to determine an individual's personal ethical values."39
It is not, therefore, a substitute for a character and fitness
examination. Nor does the test require the examinee to demonstrate
competence in the ability to engage in a thoughtful and extended
analysis of ethical options presented by a particular set of facts. One
NCBE leader has called it "an awareness test," whose "goal is to
make the applicant acutely mindful that the profession considers
34. Will Shafroth, Bar Examiners and Examinees, Preface to 1 Bar Examiner 1
(1931) (appearing in the bound edition).
35. See id. (noting that bar exams "test the training which has been given in the
law schools," forcing law schools to "a keener realization that their products must
have more than a theoretical knowledge of law").
36. Yoshio Shigezawa, Observations-Bar Examiners and Bar Examinations-
1974,43 Bar Examiner 147, 147 (1974).
37. How to Use the Questions and the Statistical Services of the Bar Examination
Service Committee, 29 Bar Examiner 10, 27 (1960) (remarks of John T. DeGraff,
Chairman of the Bar Examination Service Committee).
38. Qualifications of Applicants Seeking to Take a Bar Examination: A Panel
Discussion, 31 Bar Examiner 78, 83 (1962) (remarks of Loren E. Souers, Jr.).
39. 2002 MPRE Booklet, supra note 17, at 30.
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ethics a matter of the highest priority in the practice of law."4" But of
course such a general awareness would not be of much assistance in
passing the test. Rather, the applicant must demonstrate some facility
with applying the underlying doctrine on which the test is based, once
the Model Code, then the Model Rules, now a broader set of rules.
This is not, of course, all there is to ethics, but it is something.4 As to
the MPRE's function in assessing how law schools are doing, the
MPRE does provide (as does the more general bar examination) an
imperfect check on law schools' effectiveness in teaching their
students the doctrines of professional responsibility being tested.
Unlike the general bar exam, which in large part tests legal reasoning
skills, the MPRE provides a much narrower assessment. At a
minimum, the existence of the MPRE probably guarantees that the
doctrine of professional responsibility will be taught in a separate
course at most law schools.42
II. THE STANDARDIZATION AND LEGALIZATION OF ETHICS RULES
A national multiple-choice examination on legal ethics requires a
body of nationally-standardized rules of professional conduct.43 In
1970, with the ABA's promulgation of the Model Code of
Professional Conduct, such rules came onto the scene. The Code's
adoption was the most important step in the "increasing
transformation of legal ethics into formally adopted codes having no
necessary relationship to ethics or morality."'  Ethics rules that had
begun as "fraternal norms" became "judicially enforced
regulations."45
The history of the national standardization of legal ethics rules
begins not in 1970, but with the ABA's appointment in 1905 of a five-
member committee to study the drafting of a "code of professional
ethics."4  The Report of the Committee on Code of Professional
40. Susan K. Boyd, The ABA's First Section: Assuring a Qualified Bar 98 (1993)
(quoting Francis D. Morrissey, then NCBE president).
41. As one of the drafters said in 1981, "None of us are simple or naive, and we
know the problems that exist in practice and are sensitive to the plight of lawyers."
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, 50:1 Bar Examiner 21, 29 (1981)
(remarks of Eugene L. Smith). Yet the drafters believed that passing the test "will
ensure to the organized Bar that the examinee has a speaking familiarity with the
relatively hard rules of professional conduct which are ascertainable within the two
Codes." Id. at 28.
42. For some qualifications, see infra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
43. See Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, 50:1 Bar Examiner 21,
23 (1981) (remarks of Joe Covington) ("In order to offer a test for all jurisdictions, it
must be based on reasonably well defined uniform subject matter.").
44. Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in
Legal Ethics, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 901, 906 (1995).
45. Hazard, supra note 12, at 1249.
46. 29 ABA Reports 600 (1906) (quoting the 1905 resolution); Strassberg, supra
note 44, at 906.
1306 [Vol. 71
ORIGINS OF THE MPRE
Ethics, delivered to the ABA in St. Paul in the summer of 1906,
stressed the need for clear, uniform rules that could be used to
discipline unethical lawyers of low character who were joining the
ranks at an alarming pace. "We cannot be blind," said the report, "to
the fact that, however high may be the motives of some, the trend of
many is away from the ideals of the past and the tendency more and
more to reduce our high calling to the level of a trade. 4 7 The report
spoke of "changed conditions" in the bar due to "the influx of
increasing numbers, who seek admission to the profession mainly for
its emoluments."4 It lamented the new world in which "the shyster,
the barratrously inclined, the ambulance chaser, the member of the
Bar with a system of runners, pursue their nefarious methods with no
check save the rope of sand of moral suasion... so long as they...
violate no criminal law."4 9  Lawyers, the report continued, should
serve only during good behavior-and "'good behavior' should not be
a vague, meaningless or shadowy term devoid of practical
application."5"' Rather, standards of ethics should be "crystallized into
a written code" that could be used to exclude a lawyer who violates its
provisions from practicing or retaining membership in professional
organizations such as the ABA."
Despite this practical goal, the resulting Canons of Ethics as
adopted by the ABA in 1908 tended more toward moral exhortation
than rigid rule,52 and were thereby limited as effective disciplinary
codes.53 The Canons' drafters also expressly disclaimed that they
47. 29 ABA Reports 600, 601 (1906) (Report of the Committee on Code of
Professional Ethics).
48. Id. at 601.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 602.
51. Id. By the time the ABA promulgated the Canons in 1908, 31 states had
either adopted or were in the process of adopting ethics rules for lawyers. These
codes obviously lacked any pretense towards national uniformity and were
themselves usually not well-designed for disciplinary uses. Peter A. Joy, Making
Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation of Lawyers' Conduct,
15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 313, 324-25 (2002). For example, the Alabama bar had
adopted such a code of ethics in 1887, from which the Canons were "largely copied."
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 2.6.2, at 54 n.21 (1986); see also
Strassberg, supra note 44, at 906-07 n.33. The ABA committee's 1906 report
specifically cited codes of ethics adopted by the bar associations of Virginia (1887),
Wisconsin (1901), West Virginia (1902), and Kentucky (1903), "merely as illustrations
of practicability." 29 ABA Reports 604 (1906).
52. For example, Canon One stated that the "duty of the lawyer to maintain
towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." Canon
Twelve stated that "[i]n fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges which overestimate
their advice and services, as well as those which undervalue them." The Canons are
reprinted in, inter alia, Professional Responsibility Standards, Rules and Statutes,
2002-03 Edition 647 et seq. (John S. Dzienkowski, ed.) [hereinafter Professional
Responsibility Standards].
53. See Hazard, supra note 12, at 1254 n.77; Joy, supra note 51, at 325.
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comprised a complete set of ethics rules, recognizing in the Preamble
that "[n]o code or set of rules can be framed, which will particularize
all the duties of the lawyer.... [T]he enumeration of particular duties
should not be construed as a denial of the existence of others equally
imperative, though not specifically mentioned."54 These limitations
prompted Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to describe the
Canons in 1934 as "for the most part generalizations designed for an
earlier era."55  The Canons' historical significance is unquestioned,
however, simply because they were promulgated by a national group
of elite- lawyers as a uniform statement of the way ethical lawyers
behave,56 and because they were widely adopted and followed in most
states for over six decades."
By the mid-1960s, bar leaders recognized the need for a more
effective ethics code."' It was not scandal that drove this particular
reform, it was change. The 1960s witnessed the first waves of what
would become an enormous new explosion in the number of lawyers,
and clear signs of a coming radical shift in who those new lawyers
were-that is, the same sort of situation that had helped inspire the
drafting of the Canons over a half century before. Between 1963 and
1973, total law school enrollment went from 49,552 to 106,102, and
new admissions to the bar more than doubled. 59 The ABA's Section
on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar reported at the 1974
mid-year meeting that "[e]xcept for 1968, total enrollment has grown
steadily for the past 20 years and has more than doubled in the last ten
years."6"' The percentage of female law school students, for decades
stuck in the three-to-four percent range, had begun to climb in 1967-
68, and reached 20% in 1974-75.6' Between 1972 and 1973 alone,
54. Canons (preamble), reprinted in Professional Responsibility Standards, supra
note 52, at 647.
55. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1934).
56. Of course, the Canons made no attempt to reflect (or protect) all lawyers'
interests equally. The membership of ABA at the time represented only three
percent of the total number of lawyers in the country, and was drawn from an elite
stratum. Wolfram, supra note 51, § 2.6.2, at 54 n.23. The Canons, embodying the
general tenor of George Sharswood's 1854 volume called An Essay on Professional
Ethics, took several positions that made it more difficult to represent "certain classes
of clients," most notably adopting restrictions on advertising and solicitation. David
R. Papke, The Legal Profession and Its Ethical Responsibilities: A History, in Ethics
and the Legal Profession 37-38 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. Elliston, eds.) (1986).
Further, the Canons focused heavily on litigation and were silent on many important
ethical duties that arise in other kinds of practice. Wolfram, supra note 51, § 2.6.2, at
54.
57. The original 32 Canons of Ethics were expanded by the addition of Canons 33
to 47 between 1928 and 1969. See Joy, supra note 51, at 324-25.
58. ABA President Lewis Powell appointed a committee to amend the Canons in
1964. See Wolfram, supra note 51, § 2.6.3, at 56.
59. 99 ABA Reports 516 (1974) (Exhibit: Legal Education and Bar Admission
Statistics, 1963-1973).
60. Id. at 515.
61. Richard K. Neumann Jr., Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics Show,
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there was a 37.8% increase of women in first year law school classes.62
In 1974, for the first time in history, there was not a vacant seat in a
law school class in the United States.63 In this period there were even
some calls to shut down all the law schools for a few years to avoid
lawyer overpopulation. 4 In the midst of these changes, the bar's elite
came to the obvious conclusion that legal ethics could no longer be
simply part of an unwritten "gentlemen's code," enforced by the
informal sanction of shameY.6  Rules of conduct had to become more
and more formal. Whether this "legalization process has resulted in
the disintegration of the profession's sense of self,"6 6 or whether
demographic heterogeneity has caused the increasing legalization of
the rules is, of course, debatable.
Human motivation is always rife with ambiguities, and here is no
exception. It is tempting to ascribe bar leaders' renewed attention to
"professionalism" and ethics rules in times of demographic shifts
merely to petty self-interest or to racism and sexism. When one looks
at just three key periods of bar reforms - the late nineteenth to early
twentieth centuries; the 1930s to 1940s; and the mid-1960s to early
1970s-it is hard not to see the bar's "ethics focus" as representing in
part a conservative and self-interested response to the influx of would-
be lawyers of perceived "questionable character." During each of
these periods, most of the self-proclaimed "leaders of the bar" were
white men. 67  And the newcomers included (as time marched on)
50 J. Legal Educ. 313, 314 (2000).
62. 99 ABA Reports 515 (1974). see also Shirley Raissi Bysiewicz, 1972 AALS
Questionnaire on Women in Legal Education, 25 J. Legal Educ. 503 (1973) (analyzing
reasons for increased numbers of women entering law schools); Millared H. Ruud,
That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment is Portia, 60 A.B.A. J. 182-83 (1974)
(analyzing the numbers and concluding that there has been a "phenomenal increase
in the demand for approved legal education in the past decade," due in large part to
an almost ten-fold increase in female law students during that time); James P. White,
Is That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment Ending?, 61 A.B.A. J., 202 (1975)
(analyzing reasons for enrollment explosion).
63. 99 ABA Reports 514 (1974) (Report of the Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar).
64. See News of the Association: A Message from the President, 25 J. Legal Educ.
90, 90-91 (1973) (speech by AALS President Richard C. Maxwell).
65. See W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social
Norms in Professional Communities, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1955 (2001) (discussing recent
calls for a renewal of informal, community-based sanctions); David B. Wilkins, Who
Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1992) (discussing efficacy of
informal sanctions in regulating lawyer misconduct). In 1967, the ABA formed a
Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement (the Clark committee)
to address public complaints about the inadequacy of lawyer disciplinary processes in
the states. In 1970, the committee's report concluded that there was a "scandalous
situation" afoot. See Joy, supra note 51, at 327.
66. Hazard, supra note 12, at 1242.
67. The ABA mistakenly admitted three black lawyers to membership in 1911.
Upon learning their race, the ABA's executive committee declared that "the settled
practice of the Association has been to elect only white men as members." Boyd,
supra note 40, at 101. Ultimately the ABA, under internal pressure, decided to allow
2003] 1309
1310 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
immigrants from Eastern Europe, Catholics, Jews, women, and
members of racial minorities." Those in power were undoubtedly
suspicious of these new lawyers, and anxious to preserve their own
exalted position in society. Discrimination was rationalized on the
ground that "only those with a shared background could share the
values of a single code of ethics." 9 We should never forget or deny
that sordid past."0 But to attribute reforms in legal ethics (or even
rhetoric about needed reforms) solely to evil motives-especially in
the more recent periods-is to undervalue an entirely legitimate
motivation: a genuine concern to redefine and reaffirm the core values
of the legal profession as its composition changes.7
Rapid changes in lawyer numbers and demographics have
frequently created powerful ripples within the organized bar. Such a
trend was recognized by the men who formed the American Bar
Association in 1878, with the stated object to "uphold the honor of the
profession of law. ' 72  They contributed to the creation of the
Association of American Law Schools in 1900, at a time of
remarkable expansion in numbers,73 when night law schools74 were
churning out lawyers who lacked not only the social pedigree of the
leaders of the bar, but frequently a high school education.7 ' A belief
that bar examiners were "admitting too many new lawyers" was a
prime factor in the creation of the NCBE in 1931. When returning
World War II veterans flooded into law schools-and admissions
directors "were getting applicants from colleges they had heard of but
the three to remain members, but required future applicants to indicate their race.
Non-whites were allowed to join the ABA (with some restrictions) beginning in 1943.
Full admission of black lawyers was not approved until 1950. Id.
68. See Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 538 (2d Ed. 1985)
(describing the night law schools of the late nineteenth century as "breeding grounds
for the ethnic bar").
69. Boyd, supra note 40, at 16.
70. Perhaps the most outrageous comment by a respectable legal ethicist was
uttered by Henry Drinker in the late 1920s, when he commented that many ethical
lapses were committed by "Russian Jew boys" because they did not possess true
American ideals. See Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from
the 1850s to the 1980s, at 184 n.41 (1983) [hereinafter Stevens, Law School].
71. See, e.g., Papke, supra note 56, at 29 (analyzing the often conflicting motives of
legal ethics reformers); Stevens, Law School, supra note 70, at 100-02 (discussing the
mixed motives of those attempting to raise law school standards in the early 1900s).
72. 1 ABA Reports 16 (1878) (draft constitution of the ABA).
73. The lawyer population explosion was truly amazing between 1870 (when there
were 28 law schools and 1,600 students) and 1900 (when there were about 100 schools
and 13,000 students). Thomas, supra note 33, at 237.
74. There were nine night law schools in 1890, twenty in 1900. Friedman, supra
note 68, at 619.
75. See Boyd, supra note 40, at 15-16 (implying that new standard requiring high
school diploma for law students suggests that, prior to the standard, students could
enroll in law school without a high school diploma).
76. Id. at 37-38. See also Editorial, 1 Bar Examiner 211 (1932) (focusing on the
"overcrowded condition of the bar").
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knew nothing about" - the Law School Admission Counsel was
formed, and the Law School Admission Test was developed to
provide a standardized criterion.7"
So in the 1960s, as changes rocked the nation and the profession,
work began on drafting a new kind of ethics code, one tighter and
more definite than the Canons had been.78 The ABA Committee that
began that project was made up "mostly [of] senior practitioners of
long standing in the organized bar," who conducted deliberations in
closed meetings, held no hearings, and circulated no interim drafts
before publishing their final draft in 1968.79 The final product,
approved the following year by the ABA and promulgated in 1970,
was the first code to "embrace[] legally binding norms in the form of
the Disciplinary Rules, albeit also retaining (in the Ethical
Considerations) the fraternal voice of the Canons. '80 Most states
quickly adopted them, following a "highly organized campaign" by
the ABA to achieve that goal.81
These rules formed the core text that was to be tested on the MPRE
ten years later. The examiners, looking to the national, standardized
code, could now frame questions like this for examinees in any state to
answer:
Although licensed to practice law in State, Attorney Alpha does not
practice law but works as an investment broker. Alpha could have
elected inactive status as a member of the bar, but chose not to do
so. Recently, in connection with a sale of worthless securities, Alpha
made materially false representations to Victim, an investment
customer. Victim sued Alpha for civil fraud, and a jury returned a
verdict in Victim's favor. Alpha did not appeal.
Is Alpha subject to discipline?
A. Yes, because Alpha was pursuing a non-legal occupation while
an active member of the bar.
B. Yes, because Alpha's conduct was fraudulent.
C. No, because Alpha was not convicted of a crime.
77. Boyd, supra note 40, at 51-52. The LSAT, which first went into use in 1948,
began as an experiment conducted by the law schools at Columbia, Harvard and Yale,
in conjunction with the Educational Testing Service of Princeton. Id. at 52.
78. See generally Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy between Standards and Rules: A
New Way of Understanding the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of
Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1117 (1999)
(providing a trenchant analysis of the evolution of the ABA's model codes).
79. Hazard, supra note 12, at 1252-53.
80. Id. at 1251.
81. Wolfram, supra note 51, § 2.6.3, at 56 (noting that, by 1972, "every jurisdiction
had taken steps to adopt the Code except three states").
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D. No, unless the standard of proof in the state is the same in lawyer
disciplinary cases and civil cases. 8
2
The question has but one answer (B, of course), an answer that
came from the text of the Code. 3 We had a national, standardized
test on legal ethics-albeit one that, like the Code itself, could not
possibly address the complete spectrum of issues raised by the topic. 4
The Code itself was soon criticized on a number of grounds, and
threats of an antitrust action by the U.S. Department of Justice
prompted the ABA to begin a wholesale revision of the Code just
seven years after its promulgationY.8  The ABA's Kutak Commission
(named after its chair, Omaha lawyer Robert Kutak) began its work
in 1977 and within two years drafts were circulating. 6 In contrast to
the secretive drafting process of the Code, this one was open and
"quasi-legislative"-draft after draft circulated for comments, revision
after revision responded to those comments. 7 The Model Rules that
finally emerged (as promulgated by the ABA in 1983) "affirmed that
the standards of professional conduct were legal obligations and not
merely professional ones."88 In format, the Model Rules look much
like a Restatement of the Law, with black-letter rules followed by
often-lengthy Comments designed to "provide guidance for practicing
in compliance with the Rules."8 9 The Model Rules have now been
adopted by almost all states, although there have been several state
variations on key rules, most notably confidentiality.Y
The text of the Model Rules does not provide a complete picture of
legal ethics any more than the Code or the Canons did. The drafters
never believed otherwise. The Model Rules' Preamble states that
while "[m]any of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are
82. The question is contained in the 2002 MPRE Booklet, supra note 17, at 37.
83. DR 1-102 (4) provides that a lawyer shall not "engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." The answer is the same under MR
8.4(c).
84. The MPRE has always been designed only to test "knowledge of established
ethical legal standards," originally as contained in the written codes alone. Multistate
Professional Responsibility Exam, 50:1 Bar Examiner 21, 22 (1981) (remarks of Joe
Covington); Id. at 26 (remarks of Eugene L. Smith) (admitting the limited scope of
the MPRE, but concluding that the "distinctive [rules] to the profession" as embodied
in the Code "not only can be taught, they can be tested upon").
85. Wolfram, supra note 51, § 2.6.4, at 60-61.
86. Id. at 61.
87. Hazard, supra note 12, at 1253.
88. Id. at 1254.
89. ABA Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Scope, reprinted in Professional
Responsibility Standards, supra note 52, at 10 [hereinafter Model Rules].
90. Over eighty percent of U.S. jurisdictions have adopted some version of the
Model Rules. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Professional Responsibility: A Student's
Guide § 1-1.5.4, at 7-8 (2002). The ABA's massive Model Rules revision project,
called Ethics 2000, has recently been completed and states have begun to react to it.
See Professional Responsibility Standards, supra note 52, at 5 (describing the status of
the revision); id. at 7 et seq. (containing the full text of the revised rules).
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prescribed in the Rules," substantive and procedural law outside the
rules as well as "personal conscience and the approbation of
professional peers" also defines proper lawyer behavior.91 Further,
the Scope section recognizes that "The Rules presuppose a larger
legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court
rules and statutes ... and substantive and procedural law in general. '9 2
While this "other law" is spread throughout many sources-in pre-
computer days we would say it could be found all over the law
library-even this disparate doctrinal material has been subjected to
substantial ordering by the American Law Institute's promulgation of
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers in 1998. For
example, the Restatement contains sections on civil liability, the
attorney-client privilege, and the formation of the lawyer-client
relationship-areas expressly not addressed by the Model Rules.
While the Restatement is not a true codification, 93 it certainly
represents a further move towards national standardization of the
rules defining ethical lawyering. 94
The Model Rules have largely completed what the Code had
started in 1969, transforming the rules of ethics into positive
doctrine 95-doctrine imminently suited for multiple-choice testing.
With each successive set of ethics rules, from the Canons to the Code
to the Rules, the ABA has "moved toward more definite and
complete statements of a lawyer's obligations to clients, courts,
91. ABA Model Rules (as amended 2002) (Preamble), reprinted in Professional
Responsibility Standards, supra note 52, at 8.
92. ABA Model Rules, Scope, reprinted in Professional Responsibility Standards,
supra note 52, at 10.
93. The movement to codify American law-to "gather together the real
principles of law, put them together, and build a simple, complete and sensible code"
that could be enacted by legislatures-peaked during the last third of the nineteenth
century. See Friedman, supra note 68, at 403-11. California's enactment of its Civil
Code in 1872 was probably its high point. Id. at 405. For concise analyses, see, e.g.,
Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal Thought from Premodernism to
Postmodernism: An Intellectual Voyage 55-56, 70-71, 105-06 (2000); Grant Gilmore,
The Ages of American Law 25-28 (1977).
94. This is a major purpose of any Restatement. The ALI's original conception
was to produce "a source 'to enable a lawyer to learn without the necessity of
consulting further authority, the simple and certain matters of the law."' John P.
Frank, The American Law Institute 1923-1998, in ALI Seventy-Fifth Anniversary 4, 10
(1998). Benjamin Cardozo, while a vice-president of the ALI, said of the
Restatements that "no project so important for the simplification of our common law
and for its harmonious development has been launched during all the years of its
history upon the soil of the new Pavlovian World." Id. at 14. This particular drive to
bring order to perceived chaos in the decisional law has been traced to Dean Roscoe
Pound's influential speech to the ABA in 1906, in which he lambasted the splintered
state of law and lawyering. See N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New
Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, in Frank, supra, at 49, 53-55.
95. See, e.g., Robert J. Kutak, The Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some Observations
About the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1, 5-6
(1980) (referring to the then-nascent Model Rules as "black letter statements of the
practice of ethical lawyering").
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opposing parties, and third persons."9 While this movement has been
criticized,97 it has by any estimate flourished over the past century.
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers furnishes another
collection of black-letter rules. With the nationally-uniform source
material for multiple-choice testing in legal ethics growing like kudzu,
this key precondition for the MPRE's existence has only become
stronger over the last two decades. Indeed, it seems accurate to see
the MPRE's success in sweeping across the nation as a "tacit
endorsement" of the concept of a national code of ethics.98
III. THE NATIONAL STANDARDIZATION OF BAR EXAMINATIONS
A. The Progression from Oral to Written Bar Examinations
The MPRE would not have appeared in the form it did had it not
been for the earlier evolution of bar examinations from informal and
highly variable tests to more nationally standardized ones. One can
see two immediate antecedents to the MPRE: the Multistate Bar
Exam ("MBE"), which was first given in 1972, and the California
Professional Ethics Exam, first offered in 1975. To understand the
strength of these connections, however, one must take a longer look
backwards.
Bar examinations of any kind were rare in our nation's early
history. In the colonial period, admission to practice was most
frequently accomplished by motion to the court after the applicant
had served a long apprenticeship in a law office,9 9 or by proof to the
96. Joy, supra note 51, at 329.
97. See, e.g., Michael K. McChrystal, The Battle for the Future of Professional
Responsibility: The Meaning of Professionalism, 59:2 Bar Examiner 16, 16 (1990) ("In
the past two decades... the dominant lawyer ethos has been covered by rule after
rule. Decisions in professional responsibility cases are more frequently expressed in
technical analysis of rule language and extensive citation of decisional law, and the
ethos giving rise to those decisions is hidden from view more often than ever
before."); Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 665,
730-31 (1994) (noting that one problem with the "bar codification processes stems
from the insistence on uniform standards for increasingly diverse professional
settings," leading to a kind of "lower common denominators" approach to legal
ethics); Simon, supra note 9, at 5-6 (criticizing black-letter ethics rules as failing to
capture the key role of lawyer judgment in many hard ethical choices).
98. Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multi-Jurisdictional Practice-Is
Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer, or No Answer at All?, 36 S. Tex. L. Rev. 715,
733 (1995); but cf. Hake, supra note 9, at 739 (arguing that "[l]egal ethics has a local
rather than national flavor, in the sense that most actual ethical decisions are made by
local bar authorities and local courts," but admitting that training at a "national law
school" produces an idealized view of uniformity). I simply note that at times,
perception is reality; Levin, supra note 15, at 406 & n.44 (disagreeing with Daly, while
admitting that any idea to drop the MPRE "flies in the face of growing calls for
national rules of professional responsibility").
99. James Duke Cameron, The Court Looks at Bar Admissions, 46:1 Bar
Examiner 7, 9 (1977).
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court of prior membership in one of the English Inns of Court.' Oral
bar examinations were sometimes given; New Jersey required an oral
exam as early as 1755.1°1 After the Revolution, these practices
continued until the 1830s when, in the Jacksonian era, some states
offered bar admission without any examination or other qualification
whatsoever.112 The most noteworthy example was Indiana, whose
1851 Constitution provided that "Every person of good moral
character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to practice law
in all courts of justice." (This provision was not repealed until 1932.)' 1 3
In most states, the oral bar examination tradition continued well
into the nineteenth century, with the applicant typically being
questioned in open court by judges."° As the number of bar
applicants grew, the oral examination fell increasingly to lawyers
appointed to ask the questions and evaluate the responses.10 5
Whether conducted by judges or appointed bar examiners, the oral
exams were usually short and focused on rote formalities such as time
limits and forms of pleading." 6 As one NCBE chairman put it, in
those days "there was little more formality in being admitted to the
bar than there is today in getting a library card from a public
library."' "1 7 Oral bar exams functioned as a test-albeit usually a non-
standardized and truncated one-of both competence and character.
That is, the examiner's task was not only to test the examinee's
knowledge of at least some legal matters, but also to gauge the
examinee's worth as a person." 8 One ABA official described oral bar
100. George Neff Stevens, Diploma Privilege, Bar Examination or Open
Admission, 46 Bar Examiner 15, 16-17 (1977) [hereinafter George Stevens, Diploma
Privilege].
101. Cameron, supra note 99, at 9 & n.12.
102. Arthur Karger, The Role of the NCBE in the Bar Admission Process: Its First
Fifty Years, 50:3 Bar Examiner 7, 8 (1981); George Stevens, Diploma Privilege, supra
note 100, at 17.
103. For a discussion of this provision, see, e.g., Bernard C. Gavit, Indiana's
Constitution and the Problem of Admission to the Bar, 16 A.B.A. J. 595, 595 (1930).
104. George Stevens, Diploma Privilege, supra note 100, at 17.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Charles P. Megan, Some Commentaries on Bar Examination Methods, 3 Bar
Examiner 269, 269 (1934).
108. In a 1934 opinion, the California Supreme Court seemed to express some
degree of wistful longing for the "old days" where a man's character could be sized up
in a face-to-face oral bar exam during which the judge could "give considerable
consideration to what, for a better name, was called 'the background' of the
applicant's preparation," including his "personal appearance and other phases of the
personality of the applicant." In re Investigation of Conduct of Examination for
Admission to Practice Law, 33 P.2d 829, 832 (Cal. 1934). From today's perspective,
such a process looks like an effective vehicle for insidious discrimination. In the 1930s
a county character and fitness examiner from Pennsylvania spoke of applicants
"whom the Board does not think have been brought up in the proper way, others
whose very manners are so unprepossessing that it does not seem logical that they
should be admitted. The most difficult question ... is as to whether they should reject
a man because of his appearance, his manner, or general surroundings. They do not
2003] 1315
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
exams as allowing for a "[c]areful individual personality appraisal."'0 9
The certification of each applicant's "character and fitness" has been a
constant requirement in this country, and continues today in different
forms. Today, state bar examiners or separate character committees
generally conduct the inquiry into each applicant's character and
fitness.' '
Examinations were sometimes bizarrely informal. In what is
undoubtedly the most famous example of this point, Abraham
Lincoln was appointed to examine an applicant named Jonathan
Birch.''" Birch was summoned to Lincoln's hotel room in
Bloomington, Illinois. When the door opened, according to Birch, he
found Lincoln taking a bath.
I shall never forget the queer feeling that came over me as his lank,
half-nude figure moved to and fro between me and the window...
'How long have you been studying,' he asked. 'Almost two years,'
was my response .... 'What books have you read?' I told him, and
he said it was more than he read before he was admitted to the
bar....
Then he resumed the examination. He asked me in a desultory way
the definition of a contract, and two or three fundamental
questions.... Beyond these meager inquiries, as I now recall the
incident, he asked nothing more.
As he continued his toilet, he entertained me with recollections-
many of them characteristically vivid and racy-of his early
practice.... The whole proceeding was so unusual and queer...
that I was at a loss to determine whether I was really being
examined at all or not."1
2
think he should practice law but they have nothing against him." Character
Examination of Candidates, 1 Bar Examiner 63, 67 (1931). Another examiner sitting
on the same panel remarked with apparent surprise, "Sometimes you have wonderful
character evidence displayed even though the applicant is not well educated or his
parents were born in Russia." Id. at 72.
109. John Kirkland Clark, The Preparation of Bar Examination Questions, I Bar
Examiner 78, 78 (1931).
110. See generally Frederick A. Elliston, The Ethics of Ethics Tests for Lawyers, in
Ethics and The Legal Profession 50 (Michael Davis & Frederick A.Elliston, eds.)
(1986); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale L.J.
491 (1985); see also Will Shafroth, A Study of Character Examination Methods in
Forty-Nine Commonwealths, 3 Bar Examiner 195 (1934) (surveying the state
approaches at that time and making recommendations); Richard L. Sloane, Note,
Barbarian at the Gates: Revisiting the Case of Matthew F. Hale to Reaffirm that
Character and Fitness Evaluations Appropriately Preclude Racists from the Practice of
Law, 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 397 (2002) (addressing many of the modern
controversies).
111. The story is retold in Albert A. Wold, Lawyer Lincoln 153-54 (1936). It may
also be found in Jarvis, supra note 11, at 376. A slightly less detailed (and thus less
colorful) version is recounted in Megan, 3 Bar Examiner 269,269 (1934).
112. Wold, supra note 111, at 153-54.
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Lincoln reportedly jotted down a few lines on a sheet of paper, put
it in an envelope, and directed Birch to take it to Judge Logan in
Springfield. Birch recalled that Logan read the note and gave him the
required certificate "without asking a question beyond my age and
residence, and the correct way of spelling my name."'
13
As is clear from that well-worn story, the institution of oral bar
examinations did not reflect a very high degree of standardization.
Different examiners would ask entirely different questions and
evaluate the responses in different ways. It was largely in response to
these shortcomings that written bar exams developed in the latter part
of the nineteenth century."4 The first written exam was given in
Massachusetts in 1855, although only those candidates who could not
demonstrate that they had three years of legal study had to pass it,
and this experiment lasted only until 1859."5 Sporadic revivals of a
written examination requirement surfaced from time to time" 6 until a
genuine movement gained momentum late in the century. The New
York Supreme Court began to require written examinations in 1877. 17
In 1880, New Hampshire became the first state to establish a state-
wide board of bar examiners, with state-wide jurisdiction." 8 By the
following year, that state as well as Rhode Island, Nevada and Idaho
were requiring a written bar exam."' The ABA called in 1892, 1908,
1918, and 1921 resolutions for candidates for the bar to be subject to
an examination to determine fitness to practice.1 211 Between 1890 and
1914, most states came to require written bar exams.' 21 Requiring a
113. Id. at 154.
114. See Stevens, Law School, supra note 70, at 25-26.
115. Jarvis, supra note 11, at 374 (citing Wolfram, supra note 51, § 5.3, at 198, and
Alfred Z. Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law 101 n.3 (1921)).
116. See id.
117. Nat'l Conference of Bar Exam'rs, The Bar Examiners' Handbook 109 (1st ed.
1968) [hereinafter Bar Examiners' Handbook].
118. Karger, supra note 102, at 9.
119. Bar Examiners' Handbook, supra note 117, at 109.
120. See id. at 114; see also Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do We Need the Bar
Examination? A Critical Evaluation of the Justifications for the Bar Examination and
Proposed Alternatives, 45 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1191, 1192, 1201 (1995) (discussing
decline of the diploma privilege and the rise of bar exam requirements).
121. Elizabeth Chambliss, Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, A Case Study, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 817, 833 (2000). Well into the twentieth century, however, passing a
bar exam was not the only route to admission to practice law. See George Stevens,
Diploma Privilege, supra note 100, at 15-20, & 71-102 (history of each state's
admissions requirements, as of 1976). As late as 1956, eight states granted a "diploma
privilege"-allowing graduates of certain accredited schools to become members of
the state bar without sitting for the bar exam. Admissions to the Bar by States-1956,
1957, 1958, 1959, 29 Bar Examiner 84-85 (1960). In 1962, Dean Eugene Rostow of
Yale Law School thought it appropriate (and perhaps even necessary) to open a
speech to a group of bar examiners with the declaration: "First, let me make certain
things clear. I am not one of the deans who feel that the law schools should have
diploma privileges and that bar examinations should be abolished." The Law School
Dean Looks at the Bar Examination and the Examiner: A Panel Discussion, 31 Bar
Examiner 99, 99 (1962) (remarks of Eugene V. Rostow). Over the next decade,
13172003]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
written examination for admission rather than relying on less
formalized processes set the stage for the reforms to come, and
ultimately led directly to the development of national standardized
bar examinations, in the form of the MBE, and eight years later, the
MPRE.
B. Towards Greater Standardization: Objective Questions on Bar
Examinations
1. The Impetus for Objective Questions
When written bar examinations came into being, essay questions
were generally used exclusively. While essays are excellent testing
mechanisms, they do suffer from two related weaknesses: grading can
be quite subjective 2' and (even with grading inaccuracies) they take a
long time to evaluate. Subjectivity is a standing problem with essays
no matter how many must be graded; that problem is lessened by the
adoption of some multiple-choice questions on an exam, as testing
experts have concluded for some time.'23 The time problem, however,
becomes acute mainly when the number of examinees outstrips the
number of graders. When that happens, bar examiners are faced with
a tough choice: either hire more graders, or use some non-essay
questions.'24 When such a situation arose in New York in the late
1920s, bar examiners in that state addressed the problem by using
some "yes-no" questions on its bar exam, a practice that lasted for
several years. 25 A few other states, including Illinois, were using
objective questions in the mid-1960s, during that numbers crunch. 126
charges of racial discrimination (based on comparatively high failure rates among
African-American applicants) drove the National Bar Association to call for the
abandonment of bar examinations and the adoption of diploma privileges. Shigezawa,
supra note 36, at 147. Today, however, only Wisconsin has a diploma privilege, and
no other state seems to be flirting actively with the idea, whatever its merits. See
Beverly Moran, The Wisconsin Diploma Privilege: Try It, You'll Like It, 2000 Wis. L.
Rev. 645.
122. See Stephen P. Klein, Are Your Test Scores Only Half Safe?, 48 Bar Examiner
137, 137 (1979) ("The reason the essay portion poses special problems is that after the
applicant has written an answer, there is a rogue's gallery of biases and artifacts that
are likely to influence the score assigned to that answer.").
123. See id. at 137.
124. See John Kirkland Clark, The Preparation of Bar Examination Questions, 1
Bar Examiner 78, 79 (1931) ("For those, then, who have to deal with large numbers of
applicants, the method of using 'short-form' questions to be appraised on a 'true-false'
basis,-to be answered simply 'yes' or 'no'-has seemed to be desirable, if not
essential.")
125. New Jersey Asks New York, 2 Bar Examiner 216-19 (1933) (stating that as of
1933, the New York bar examiners had been using 150 such questions on each bar
exam for the past five or six years to test the "knowledge-content" of the applicant);
Philip J. Wickser, Law Schools, Bar Examiners and Bar Associations: Cooperation vs.
Insulation, 2 Bar Examiner 151,153 (1933) (describing the New York bar exam).
126. Relative Use of Essay and Objective Examinations, in Bar Examiners'
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Florida began using some multiple-choice questions on its bar exam in
1966.127
Bar examiners came to see such questions as more than a necessary
evil. Testing experts have long asserted that well-drafted objective
questions are fully capable of testing high-level mental processes,
despite a widespread belief to the contrary.128 Such questions are also
thought to offer some substantive advantages over essays. Objective
questions force the examinee to address issues the examiner wants
addressed, preventing the "reshaping [of] the question to [the
examinee's] own purpose," as can be done with essays.129 Using
objective questions also allows for much broader coverage of any
particular subject area, whereas essays allow deeper coverage. 30
Giving multiple-choice examinations is also thought to provide some
tangible practical benefits over essay examinations. First, "[o]btaining
an accurate and objective score.., is a simple and straightforward
task.' 131 Second, using such questions on part of a bar exam frees
state bar examiners for other important tasks-such as doing
character and fitness checks of applicants.
32
2. The Coming of the Multistate Bar Exam
In the late 1960s, bar examiners faced a numbers problem of
unprecedented dimensions. John Germany, former Florida bar
examiner and NCBE President, described the situation like this:
"Beginning in 1968 the number of applicants began to overwhelm us
and the rickety system we had used for testing began to break down
under the weight of these numbers. This problem was not unique to
Florida, it was a national concern.' ' 33 In response to the jump in law
students and bar examinees, the NCBE began a broad critical study of
Handbook, supra note 117, at 150-53 (reporting the results of a 1967 survey of state
bar examiners).
127. John Germany, Bar Examiners Move from Quill to Computers, 59 A.B.A. J.
1010, 1010 (1973); The Multistate Bar Examination: A Panel Discussion, 42 Bar
Examiner 6, 7 (1973) (opening statement of John A. Eckler) [hereinafter Eckler MBE
Statement].
128. John A. Winterbottom, Relative Merits of Essay and Objective Examinations,
in Bar Examiners' Handbook, supra note 117, at 146, 147-48, 150 (opining that the
best exam would combine essay and objective questions, to "take advantage of the
strengths of both types of examination").
129. Id. at 147.
130. Bar Examinations: "The State of the Art," 49:7 Bar Examiner 132, 138 (1980)
(remarks of Stephen P. Klein).
131. Klein, supra note 122, at 137.
132. See John DesCamp, et al., Admission to the Oregon State Bar, 45 Bar
Examiner 16, 20 (1976) (stating this as a reason for the adoption of the MBE in
Oregon); see also Germany, supra note 127, at 1012 (stating that Florida's bar
examiners spent over eighty percent of their time on character and fitness
evaluations).
133. Remarks of John Germany-A Farewell Address, 45 Bar Examiner 108, 108
(1976).
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the bar examination process in 1967.13' The following year saw the
appointment of a 12-member NCBE Special Bar Examination
Committee comprised of law professors, law school deans, bar
examiners, and professional testers.'35  The committee noted
"increasing concern in all States over the mounting burdens being
faced by boards of bar examiners," caused primarily by burgeoning
law school enrollments. 136  Many state bar exam boards hired
additional personnel to grade the written exams, but the time lag
between the administering of the bar exam and the reporting of
results continued to grow. 37 In one widely-reported instance, Ohio's
bar exam, given in July, was not graded until December. 38 The
NCBE committee studied earlier uses of multiple-choice questions
and became satisfied that such experiments had worked.'39
In 1970 the special committee made its report to the NCBE board,
which appointed a standing committee to begin drafting the first
MBE, comprised of 200 multiple-choice questions covering five
subject areas: torts, contracts, real property, evidence, and criminal
law." The NCBE contracted with the Educational Testing Service
(the same company that administered the LSAT and other
standardized tests) to coordinate the drafting and administering of the
new examination. 14' Questions in each of the five subject areas were
drafted by separate committees made up of three legal scholars and
two bar examiners, assisted by ETS testing experts. 42
The first MBE was administered on February 23, 1972, to roughly
5,000 applicants in 19 states.43  Adoptions by other states rapidly
followed, foreshadowing the similar success of the MPRE eight years
later. 44 Over 23,000 applicants in 35 states took the MBE in 1973.45
134. Eckler MBE Statement, supra note 127, at 42.
135. Id.; John Eckler, The Multistate Bar Examination-August, 1974, 43 Bar
Examiner 125, 128 (1974) (providing names of original committee members)
[hereinafter Eckler, August 1974].
136. Daniel C. Blom, The Multistate Bar Examination: A New Approach, 44 Bar
Examiner 8, 11 (1975).
137. Id.; Eckler MBE Statement, supra note 127, at 7.
138. Blom, supra note 136 at 11; Eckler MBE Statement, supra note 127, at 7.
139. Eckler MBE Statement, supra note 127, at 7.
140. Id.; see also Blom, supra note 136, at 11. Constitutional law-arguably a more
relevant subject-area than ethics in terms of stemming future Watergates-was added
to the MBE's coverage in 1976.
141. Eckler MBE Statement, supra note 127, at 8-9.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 9.
144. The NCBE did not adopt a neutral, take-it-or-leave-it marketing strategy with
state bar examiners once the MBE had been written. As one former NCBE
Chairman candidly admitted, the standing Bar Examination Committee "had the task
of convincing bar examiners that an objective test, properly devised, could perform as
well or better than the traditional essay examination. In a profession where written
communication is considered to be of high importance, this was by no means an easy
task." Yoshio Shigezawa, Address at Conference of Chief Justices, 43 Bar Examiner
153 (1974). The NCBE succeeded grandly, despite such difficulties of persuasion.
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By 1976, forty-four jurisdictions had adopted the MBE, with only
eight states not participating. 14 6  Three decades after its initial
appearance, the MBE has become part of the bar examination in all
but two states, Louisiana and Washington; in 2001, just under 65,000
applicants took it. 14
7
By all accounts, the MBE has helped solve the problem of the large
number of bar applicants overwhelming the examination system itself.
As a former NCBE Chairman said in 1979 about the Georgia
experience, the coming of the MBE "saved our lives in terms of the
number of applicants we were getting and the antiquated machinery
we had for handling the ever increasing numbers.""14
C. The Ultimate Standardization: The Promise of a National Bar
Examination
The MBE would never have gained acceptance, and the MPRE
would never have been possible, had it not been for the fact that many
influential bar leaders believed that we should have a truly national
bar exam, a standardized test that could be used in every state.
Proponents of such a test assert that the very system of state control
over bar admissions produces intolerable inefficiencies when states
are essentially testing on the same materials. For example, in 1972,
NCBE Chairman John Eckler lamented of "a great duplication of
effort" and a "waste of manpower" in the pre-MBE world in which
bar examiners from fifty-two U.S. jurisdictions were needlessly
"preparing bar examinations in various forms, presenting those bar
examinations, and grading them."'49 The NCBE's special committee
appointed to study bar exams found that "each Board of Bar
Examiners was doing about the same thing as boards in other States
were doing. There was an obvious duplication of effort and
inefficiency in the husbanding of available skill and talent."'150
The concept of a national bar exam, which is a corollary to the
broader and more controversial proposition that we should have a
"national bar" (with no state variation in admissions criteria) was not
new in the 1960s. Indeed, the historical record demonstrates that calls
for uniformity in admissions standards, including the bar exam, have
been fairly continuous since the organized bar first got organized. At
the very first meeting of the ABA in 1878, the association adopted a
145. Id.
146. Joe E. Covington, The Multistate Bar Examination-1976, 45 Bar Examiner 70
(1976).
147. NCBE 2001 Statistics, 76:2 Bar Examiner 18 (May 2001). Current statistics
are available on the NCBE's website, www.ncbex.org/ncbex.htm.
148. Discussion of Multistate Bar Examination Program, 48 Bar Examiner 53, 53
(1979) (remarks of Chairman Trammell E. Vickery).
149. Eckler MBE Statement, supra note 127, at 6.
150. Eckler, August 1974, supra note 135, at 128.
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resolution calling for the Committee on Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar to "report, at the ensuing annual meeting,
some plan for assimilating throughout the Union, the requirements of
candidates for admission to the bar, and for regulating, on principles
of comity, the standing, throughout the Union, of gentlemen already
admitted to practice in their own States." 51 The Committee's report
the following year recommended that laws be enacted for that very
purpose, specifically urging that states admit to the practice of law
"those who have practised for three years in the highest court of the
state of which they are citizens." '152
At the first meeting of the NCBE in Atlantic City in 1931, one of its
founders expressed the hope that the NCBE could do for bar
examinations what the American Law Institute had done for the
common law, stressing the "beneficial tendency of standardization
among the various states."'53 He predicted that "many state boards
would welcome a decided approach towards standardization in
questions propounded. In this respect it is certain that many states
would regard themselves as having made definite improvements if
their questions were more similar to those given by the efficient
boards in New York and Pennsylvania." 54 Another NCBE officer
argued that it was time for a "national board of law examiners" that
could coordinate the drafting of uniform exam questions by national
experts: "Can anyone doubt that Wigmore can prepare a better
examination on Evidence or Williston a better examination on
Contracts than could the average bar examiner?"' 55
In 1941, the ABA's Section on Legal Education and the Bar
approved of a "standardized National Bar Examination, to be
modeled after the National Medical Examination, with questions to
be prepared by experts and to be offered on the same day across the
country."'56 The Section on Legal Education decided that such an
exam should be written and submitted to state bar examiners, who
could choose to use it or not.'57 This proposed essay examination drew
the support in principle of the AALS and the NCBE.'58 The
recommendation was ultimately shelved for further study when the
151. 1 ABA Reports 26 (1878).
152. Report of the Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 2
ABA Reports 209, 235 (1879). This concern continues to this day, focused on
developing workable rules for "multi-jurisdictional" practice. See ABA, Report of
the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice (August 2002) (setting forth ten
recommendations for changes in the ABA's current rules and practices).
153. Stanley T. Wallbank, The Function of Bar Examiners, 1 Bar Examiner 27, 36
(1931).
154. Id.
155. Will Shafroth, A National Board of Law Examiners, 1 Bar Examiner 160, 161
(1932).
156. Boyd, supra note 40, at 39.
157. Id.
158. Karger, supra note 102, at 11.
1322 [Vol. 71
ORIGINS OF THE MPRE
Section decided that it should not act too hastily in pushing for such a
reform.'59 Still, prominent leaders continued to call for the adoption
of a national bar exam, keeping the flame alight. 160
Those at the NCBE continued to believe that a major problem with
state-administered bar exams was unevenness in quality, and to
address this situation set up a central clearinghouse of bar essay
questions in 1953, known as the Bar Examination Service.'6 ' By the
late 1960s this exam bank contained over 4,000 questions, which state
bar examiners could order from a printed catalog containing digests of
each available question. 162 The bar examination service improved the
state exams, 63 and by its very nature led to a greater degree of
standardization.' 64 But more pronounced uniformity was just around
the corner.
The MBE's appearance in 1972 represented the partial birth, at
least, of a national bar exam. 65 Its multiple-choice format meant that
the NCBE not only offered uniform questions for the states to ask, it
provided uniform answers. If "A" is the "best answer" to question 47
in Idaho, it is also the "best answer" in Georgia and Nebraska. (This
provides a far greater degree of standardization, arguably, than a
uniform national essay exam that did not provide uniform answers for
each state.) This unprecedented national standardization of bar
admissions was a controversial development, even after a century of
debate and some feints in that direction. NCBE Chairman Eckler was
well aware of the longstanding debate over the merits of a national
bar examination; the concept was by then openly endorsed not only
by the NCBE, but also by the Association of American Law Schools
and the ABA's Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar.6 6 Eckler (who served as chairman of both the original special
159. Boyd, supra note 40, at 39.
160. See, e.g., James E. Brenner, Improving Bar Examinations: Some Suggestions,
36 A.B.A. J. 279,283 (1950) (proposing a high-quality national bar exam that could be
used in any state); Herbert W. Clark, Bar Examinations: Should They Be Nationally
Administered?, 36 A.B.A. J. 986 (1950) (arguing that a national bar examination
would eliminate most of the problems with the present state-run scheme); L. Dale
Coffman, A Uniform National Bar Examination: An Economical Improvement, 36
A.B.A. J. 623 (1950) (arguing that a truly national bar exam has been proposed for
over 20 years, and that all it needs for implementation is adequate funding).
161. Bar Examiners' Handbook, supra note 117, at 18. The NCBE had served as
an informal clearinghouse from its very beginnings. See Wallbank, supra note 153, at
35.
162. Bar Examiners' Handbook, supra note 117, at 18.
163. The Passing Mark and How It Should Be Determined, 32:1 Bar Examiner 12,
27 (1963) (remarks of Len Young Smith, President of the Illinois Board of Bar
Examiners).
164. By 1979, bar examiners in fifty-three jurisdictions had used the "question
pool." Report of Bar Examination Service Committee, 49:3-4 Bar Examiner 68
(1980).
165. See Karger, supra note 102, at 11.
166. Eckler, August 1974, supra note 135, at 128-29.
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committee and the standing committee that drafted the first MBE)
also recognized the political danger of overt acknowledgement that
the test was a very real step in that direction. This concern prompted
the NCBE to drop its plan to call its standardized test "National," and
to rename it "Multistate."' 6 7 "[T]o name it 'national' was to kill it,"
Eckler said. "The States have been fiercely proud and protective of
their sovereignty and in no place is sovereignty more jealously
guarded than in admission to a State bar."'' 6s  Ultimately Eckler
defended the exam from critics by denying that it represented an
assault on state control over bar admissions, stating that "[t]he
Multistate Bar Examination is available to any state that wishes to use
it. It does not require national participation nor national control for
its success. Any state can use the Multistate examination, interpret its
grades any way it wishes, put its cut-off of pass and fail wherever it
will. Each State board is master of its own examination."' 69 Eckler
was entirely correct to separate the idea of a national bar exam from
truly national admission; the states could all give a uniform bar exam
and still control the decision about whether to admit any particular
applicant to practice. 7 ° But the decision to name the test "multistate"
rather than "national," while politically savvy, does not obscure its
true character.
In retrospect, the flowering of the strong support for a national bar
exam (which took the form of the MBE) was another necessary
precondition for the creation of the MPRE. Today, many bar elites
continue to support the idea of a fully national bar exam, often citing
the MBE as evidence not only that such a test is feasible, but that we
are now on that road anyway. 7' As it turns out, by the time the MBE
was finalized, the NCBE was already contemplating other national
bar admissions tests. In the same year that Chairman Eckler was
disowning the "national test" characterization, former NCBE
Chairman Yoshio Shigezawa told the Conference of Chief Justices:
167. Id. at 129.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 129-30.
170. Thomas, supra note 33, at 247-48.
171. Id. at 245; Griswold, supra note 32, at 83 (arguing that "[t]here is a strong need
for a comprehensive and widely adopted national bar examination," and noting that
much progress has already been made in that direction); Eric Williams, A National
Bar-Carpe Diem, 5:2 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 201 (1996) (arguing that we already
have a de facto national bar in several areas of practice, and that "given the great
similarities of bar exams offered across the country, a true national bar exam requires
little substantive change but great procedural upheaval"); Bar Examiner's Handbook,
supra note 117, at 18 (noting "a considerable body of view favoring a nationally
administered bar examination"); see also Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline in
2050: A Look Back, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 125, 127 (1991) (a humorous look into the
future, when we have a uniform national ethics code and a federal lawyer licensing
and disciplinary system); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 Tex. L. Rev.
335, 403-04 (1994) (discussing the feasibility of uniform ethics rules at the federal
level, citing the multistate testing on most bar exams).
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"I hope that some day in the not too distant future, the [NCBE] will
be able to prepare and offer to all States an essay examination of the
quality achieved in the Multistate Bar Examination. The National
Conference will then be in a position to offer a completely packaged
bar exam."
' 17 2
Such a completely packaged bar exam, of course, would be designed
to be national in scope, as all NCBE products have been.173 The legal
ethics exam was just one more piece of the complete puzzle.
D. Ethics Testing on Bar Examinations
1. Historical Background
Although the MPRE was the first national legal ethics exam, it is a
complete myth that the states did not test on legal ethics before the
MPRE. In fact, the subject of legal ethics was tested on written bar
exams for decades, and sometimes at great length, before the MPRE
came along. A study of the Ohio bar exam in the early 1930s showed
that "[i]t often happens that the subject of Legal Ethics receives six
[essay] questions upon an examination while Constitutional Law or
Contracts are covered in only five." '174 The flavor of some of these
early ethics questions is captured in this example from the
Pennsylvania Bar Exam, circa 1930:
A, one of your clients, who has been committed by order of court to
the X asylum on the ground of insanity, requests you to petition the
court for his release. W, A's wife, and B, A's brother, urge you to
tell A that you are so petitioning the court, when in fact you are not.
They are joined in this request by 0 and P, whom you know to be
eminent psychiatrists, who state that A should not be released at
present, but that his mental condition will be improved by hearing
such a statement from you. What action should you take? 1 5
172. Shigezawa, supra note 144, at 154.
173. The MPRE was the second of the NCBE's nationally-standardized bar exams,
but it has not been the last. Since the MPRE's creation, the NCBE has produced
both a uniform essay exam (the Multistate Essay Examination, a three-hour, six-
question exam covering ten subjects not covered by the MBE, first promulgated in
1988, and used in 14 jurisdictions in 2001), and a uniform performance exam (the
Multistate Performance Test, which examines "an applicant's ability to use
fundamental lawyering skills in a realistic situation," first produced in 1997 and used
in twenty-seven jurisdictions in 2001). 2 Bar Examiner 21-24 (2002).
174. Malcolm K. Benadum, A Study of Ohio Bar Examinations, 2 Bar Examiner
137, 140 (1933) (also finding that applicants made passing scores on ethics questions
at a higher rate than in any other subject). Id. at 143.
175. A Bar Examination from Pennsylvania, 1 Bar Examiner 49, 55 (1931). A
complete 1930 analysis of this question would seem to require the application of
several of the Canons of Ethics, including 6 (Adverse Influences and Conflicting
Interests); 8 (Advising Upon the Merits of a Client's Cause); 15 (How Far a Lawyer
May Go in Supporting a Client's Cause); 22 (Candor and Fairness); 29 (Upholding
the Honor of the Profession); and 32 (The Lawyer's Duty in Its Last Analysis). See
2003] 1325
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
While undoubtedly not all states treated the subject as well as Ohio
and Pennsylvania, a survey of bar examiners in 1949 showed that legal
ethics was tested on the bar in thirty-five of the forty-nine
jurisdictions-more frequently than such subjects as trusts, sales,
taxation and administrative law. 76 A survey of thirty-five states and
the District of Columbia in the late 1960s showed that twenty-six of
them continued to test on ethics on their state bar exams. 17 Requests
for legal ethics essay questions from the NCBE's Bar Examination
Service rose dramatically just before the MPRE's appearance,
demonstrating a renewed testing interest in many states,"'x
undoubtedly driven in part-but not wholly-by the continued fallout
from Watergate.
By the mid-1970s, the NCBE had begun to formally address state
bar ethics testing practices. The resulting study uncovered
tremendous variation from state to state. For example, the length of
the test sections ranged from five minutes to two hours. 179 Another
problem was that most jurisdictions integrated the results of the ethics
questions with those of the entire exam, producing a situation in
which "an individual could demonstrate absolutely no awareness of
ethical principles" but could pass because of high scores on other
questions.'..' Yet another problem was that bar examiners found it
difficult to write decent essay questions on legal ethics."' Some state
boards had, in apparent frustration, completely dropped professional
responsibility from bar exam coverage in the years preceding the
MPRE, z although the data from the Bar Examination Service refute
any claim that most had done so. Some states had even strengthened
their ethics requirements. Florida required applicants to pass a
separate one-hour examination on professional responsibility," 3
ABA Canons, reprinted in Professional Responsibility Standards, supra note 52, at
649 et seq.
176. George Neff Stevens, Scope and Subject Content of Bar Examinations, 19 Bar
Examiner 99, 103-05, 115 (1950).
177. The Bar Examiners' Handbook, supra note 117, at 318-19 (Table 8: Subjects
Most Frequently Tested on Examinations).
178. From July 1, 1977 to June 30, 1978, state bar examiners ordered sixty-two
questions on Legal Ethics, behind only Partnerships (78), Commercial Paper (69), and
Constitutional Law (67). Report of the Bar Examination Service Committee, 48:1 The
Bar Examiner 35, 36 (1979). By contrast, in the 1973-74 year, examiners ordered only
seventeen Legal Ethics questions, placing it 21st in popularity out of 31 subject
classifications. Report of the Bar Examination Service Committee, 43 Bar Examiner
155, 157 (1974) (remarks of Len Young Smith).
179. Report of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination Committee,
50:1 Bar Examiner 18, 18 (1981) (remarks of Francis D. Morrissey).
180. Id.
181. Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, 50:1 Bar Examiner 21, 21
(1981) (remarks of Joe Covington).
182. Id.
183. John H. Moore, Editor's Note: Sequential Admission Comment, 47:6 Bar
Examiner 119 (1978) (describing the Florida bar exam, with statistics).
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meaning that applicants could no longer fail the ethics questions and
slide by because of solid answers in torts and criminal law. And
California, so often an innovator, went Florida one better (one hour,
that is).
2. California's Professional Responsibility Examination
California's answer to the problem of ethics testing on the bar was
to develop a multiple-choice test, known as the Professional
Responsibility Examination (commonly called the "PREX"), first
given to applicants in that state in February, 1975." 8 The two-hour
exam contained forty questions based on the text of the California
Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA Model Code."' Law
students were eligible to take the exam, and as in Florida, each
applicant had to pass the PREX separately from the rest of the bar
exam before being admitted to practice. 86 Examinees were instructed
that "[t]he answer to each question is the same" under both Codes,
meaning of course that there were no questions in areas on which the
two codes diverged.187 Questions asked not only about whether a
lawyer would be subject to discipline for engaging in certain kinds of
conduct, but also whether some stated action would be "proper" or
would comport with the lawyer's "ethical obligation." Many questions
(like all good multiple-choice questions) required at least some
knowledge of several rules for a complete analysis. For example, this
was Question 16 on the inaugural California test:
Attorney represents Client in a matter involving a claim by the
United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for unpaid income
taxes for the years 1971-1973. Client informs Attorney that before
consulting Attorney, Client gave IRS false financial statements for
the years in question.
It is proper for Attorney to
(A) continue to represent Client and make no disclosure
(B) inform IRS concerning the false financial statements
(C) immediately withdraw from the case
184. The entire February 1975 examination, along with the instructions and an
answer key, is reprinted in 46 Bar Examiner 191 (1977).
185. California Professional Responsibility Exam (Feb. 1975), instruction sheet,
reprinted in 46 Bar Examiner 191, 206 (1977).
186. Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, 50:1 Bar Examiner 21, 21
(1981) (remarks of Joe Covington).
187. California Professional Responsibility Exam (Feb. 1975), Instruction Sheet,
reprinted in 46 Bar Examiner 191, 206 (1977).
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(D) advise client that Attorney will withdraw from the case unless
Client makes a full disclosure to IRS 188
Other questions covered issues relating to such matters as bar
admissions, advancing funds to clients involved in litigation, engaging
in unlawful conduct not related to law practice, conflicts of interest in
several settings, proper handling of client funds, fees, and the
propriety of specified settlement tactics. The California test was
drafted by a small team of law professors, including John F. Sutton,
Jr., of the University of Texas (reporter-draftsman of the ABA Model
Code) and Wayne Thode of the University of Utah (reporter-
draftsman of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct) at the core of the
team. "'9 The exam's success led to the NCBE's retention of the entire
California drafting team to write the national exam that became the
MPRE. 9" In effect, this pedigree insured that the MPRE had been
thoroughly vetted for years, with California applicants the guinea pigs,
at the time of its very first offering. Undoubtedly this eased the
MPRE's rapid and virtually uniform acceptance by bar examiners in
other states.
IV. THE STRENGTHENING OF LAW SCHOOL ACCREDITATION
STANDARDS
A. The Development of the Standards for Law Schools
From its very founding, the ABA was a proponent of greater
standardization of law schools in order to improve the quality of the
education students received.' This was viewed as a centrally-
important remedy for the perceived crisis created by the influx of new
lawyers of low ethics and poor schooling, given "the intimate relation
of education and professional character."' 92  At the second annual
meeting of the fledgling organization in Saratoga Springs, New York,
in the Summer of 1879, the chair of the Committee on Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar signaled basic agreement with
the New York Bar Association's charge that
the general standard of professional learning and obligation began
to decline in American cities about the year 1840, and preserved a
downward tendency until 1870, when it reached its lowest ebb....
[T]his is ascribed to the changes in laws regulating admission to the
bar, and by means of which the ignorant, and, it is said, the
188. The correct answer is D, according to the test's answer key.
189. Eugene F. Scoles, A Decade in the Development and Drafting of the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination, 59:2 Bar Examiner 20, 21-22 (1990).
Professor Scoles was also an original member of the drafting team.
190. See id. at 22.
191. Stevens, Law School, supra note 70, at 93.
192. Report of the Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 2
ABA Reports 233 (1879).
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unprincipled, were launched on professional experience and
temptations in extraordinary numbers, without preparation of any
suitable kind.
93
The solution proposed? "[1]t may be safely asserted," the
committee's report continued, "that the true instrumentality for
improvement in our country now is, as it has always proved to be
elsewhere, the school of law."' 9' 4 This same ABA Committee adopted
a resolution urging the states to recommend that law schools teach a
number of core subjects, the first listed being "Moral and Political
Philosophy."' 9'
The ABA continued to focus on raising standards as the number of
law schools grew, and this was thought to be best accomplished by
national standardization. As Robert Stevens explains,
The association might have opted for institutionalizing diversity,
although that would have run counter to the egalitarian ethos of the
nation. It would have seemed even more un-American in the last
part of the nineteenth century, a period when standardization was a
national watchword, not only in the profession but throughout
industry and commerce.... [A]lmost all were adamant that a
uniform type of law school should control entry to the profession.'96
By 1891, however, only one of every five lawyers admitted to
practice in the United States had attended law school.' 97 The ABA's
continued interest in pushing for its standardized law school agenda
led to the creation of the first ABA section, the Section of Legal
Education and Admission to the Bar, in 1893, which was dedicated to
provide an opportunity for focused study and discussion of legal
education.'98 The Section began to take the leadership role in
developing law school standards; in 1896 the Section adopted a
resolution that the ABA should formally adopt such standards.' 99 The
ABA was not yet accrediting law schools, however, and in 1900 the
Section on Legal Education created the Association of American Law
Schools to help with a regulatory function.'
193. Id at 212.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 235. The ABA's earliest efforts to reform legal education focused on
greater standardization with higher standards-"to give symmetry to legal education
as a system; to have it advance and reach, as far as practicable, homogeneity, and a
common standard." Id. at 232. The ABA's refusal to require any single model of
teaching legal ethics during the debates over Standard 302(a) demonstrates a contrary
position-one decidedly pro-diversity, with respect to how particular subjects are
taught. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
196. Stevens, Law School, supra note 70, at 92 (footnotes omitted).
197. Id. at 95.
198. Boyd, supra note 40, at 11-12.
199. Id. at 12.
200. Id. at 15.
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It was not until 1921 that the ABA adopted its first Standards for
Legal Education under the leadership of Elihu Root,2 1' a former U.S.
Secretary of War, Secretary of State, Senator, and winner of the 1912
Nobel Peace Prize.2  Root's committee's motion for the adoption of
these standards was seconded by William Howard Taft, the Chief
Justice of the United States and the former President 3.20  This event
marked the beginnings of the ABA as a law school accrediting
agency,21 4 even though the ABA at that time did not have any
enforcement powers.2 5 In 1923, the ABA issued its first list of
approved law schools (made up of schools that complied with its
Standards).21 6 Through the remainder of the decade, the ABA and
the AALS worked closely together to develop new regulations for law
schools, including minimum teacher-student ratios, library volumes,
and pre-law school educational experience for students. 27 During this
time the number of law schools rose dramatically (from 142 in 1921 to
173 in 1928), only half of which were on the ABA and AALS
approved lists.1  One result of these developments was to cause law
schools to be more alike, and this was clearly the ABA's goal. 09
There was, in other words, an "accelerating homogenization of law
schools" attributable to the ABA's Standards. 2"'
While the 1921 Standards21' were revised frequently (such as by
upping the minimum number of volumes required in the law library
and the minimum number of full-time professors), 2 the ABA did not
begin a complete revision of the Standards until the late 1960s. It was
201. Id. at 21.
202. Id. at 24.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 28.
205. Stevens, Law School, supra note 70, at 172 (describing the ABA as "an
entirely voluntary body").
206. Id. at 173.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 173-74.
209. See Mass. Sch. Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 846 F. Supp. 374 (E.D.
Pa. 1994); Herbert L. Packer & Thomas Erlich, New Directions in Legal Education
25-26 (1972) (discussing the goal of homogenization, on the Harvard model). This has
sparked controversy, as well as a notable lawsuit. See, e.g., Marina Lao, Discrediting
Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal Education, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 1035 (2001)
(applying the Sherman Act to law school accreditation); James P. White, The Consent
Decree and Accreditation, in Legal Education for the 21st Century 467 (Donald B.
King, ed.) (1999) (analyzing consent decree in Massachusetts School of Law case);
Peter James Kolovos, Note, Antitrust Law and Nonprofit Organizations: The Law
School Accreditation Case, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 689 (1996) (analyzing the 1994 suit by
the Massachusetts School of Law at Andover against the ABA and the resulting
consent decree); see also Andover, 846 F. Supp. 374.
210. Stevens, Law School, supra note 70, at 174.
211. The 1921 Standards are reprinted in 1 Bar Examiner 277 et seq. (1932), and in
James P. White, Legal Education in the Era of Change: Law School Autonomy, 1987
Duke L.J. 292, 294-95.
212. Stevens, Law School, supra note 70, at 179.
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this revision, with its professional responsibility requirement, that
provided yet another of the MPRE's strong historical roots.213
B. The Professional Responsibility Requirement
One of the most important steps towards the MPRE was the ABA's
1973 adoption of Standard 302(a), which required each ABA
approved law school to provide and require for all student candidates
for a professional degree, "instruction in the duties and
responsibilities of the legal profession," as well as to offer "training in
professional skills, such as counseling, the drafting of legal documents
and materials, and trial and appellate advocacy. 2 14 Contrary to some
casual readings, the Standard did not and does not require the
teaching of any separate course in the subject.215  Indeed, in the
following year the State Bar of Arizona unsuccessfully presented a
resolution to amend Standard 302(a)(iii) to require schools to provide
a "course for credit" on legal ethics. 216  The Section on Legal
Education presented a substitute motion, passed by the House by
voice vote, which added a second paragraph to 302(a)(iii):
Such required instruction need not be limited to any pedagogical
method as long as the history, goals, structure and responsibilities of
the legal profession and its members, including the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility, are all covered. Each law school is
encouraged to involve members of the bench and bar in such
instructions.
217
213. Arthur Karger, Bar Admission Standards and Academic Freedom of the Law
Schools: Are They in Conflict?, 49 Bar Examiner 29, 31 (1980) ("By way of
implementation of the ABA requirement ... the NCBE has developed a new multi-
state examination on the subject of professional responsibility.").
214. The full text of the 1973 Standards for the Approval of Law Schools may be
found in Report No. 1 of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
98 ABA Reports 351, 352 et seq. (1973). For a detailed account of the debate leading
up to its approval, see House Disapproves UMVARA, Supports the Exclusionary
Rule, and Adopts New Law School Standards, 59 A.B.A. J. 384, 388-90 (1973). The
original draft brought before the House did not require students to take such
instruction in professional responsibility, it merely required schools to offer it. The
Standard was amended from the floor. Id.; see also Robert W. Meserve, President's
Page, 59 A.B.A. J. 327 (1973) (highlighting this change as evidence of the ABA's
"desire that there be greater law school emphasis on the teaching of professional
responsibility").
215. The current Standard (renumbered as 302(b)) now reads in full:
A law school shall require all students in the J.D. program to receive
instruction in the history, goals, structure, duties, values, and responsibilities
of the legal profession and its members, including instruction in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association. A law
school should involve members of the bench and bar in this instruction.
ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools 24 (2001) [hereinafter ABA Standards].
216. 99 ABA Reports 578 (1974) (House of Delegates proceedings).
217. Id.
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It is tempting to attribute the adoption of Standard 302(a) to the
Watergate scandal, but such a literal connection simply cannot exist.
The ABA's revision of law school accreditation rules had been in the
works long before any of the Watergate events had occurred. The
ABA began its process of revising its 1921 Standards for Legal
Education in the late 1960s.2" The first draft was put out for comment
in December, 1971.219 After two more drafts, the ABA's Section on
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar approved the new
Standards in toto on August 15, 1972.220 That comprehensive set of
new Standards (including 302(a)) was adopted by the House of
Delegates at the ABA's mid-year meeting in February, 1973.221 It is
true that the Watergate break-in had occurred June 17, 1972 (that is,
eight months prior to the ABA's final approval of the new standards),
and most of the Watergate burglars had pleaded guilty in January,
1973.222 G. Gordon Liddy (the lone lawyer-burglar) was convicted of
the burglary in March, 1973-the month after the ABA's passage of
302(a).223 But other key events in the affair had not yet occurred, and
the extent of the cover-up was not yet known. Attorney General John
Mitchell's obstruction of justice and perjury (for which he was later
indicted) did not even occur until March 20, 1973, when he testified
falsely before a grand jury.24 That lawyers were involved to any real
extent at all in the planning or cover-up did not become known until
the Senate Watergate hearings were held, between May 17 and
August 7, 1973.225 The existence of the Nixon tapes (which broke the
lawyer part of the story) was the dramatic centerpiece of those
hearings; the Nixon tapes were subpoenaed on July 23, 197322 6 - five
full months after 302(a)'s adoption. Scholars are certainly not wrong
to connect Watergate to the rapid creation of required ethics courses
218. Forward to ABA Standards, supra note 215, at 5.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 5-6.
221. Id. at 6.
222. See United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 432 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
223. United States v. Liddy, 510 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (affirming his
conviction). After Liddy's disbarment in New York, the President of the ABA
commented with apparent relief that Liddy "had not been a member of the American
Bar Association for several years." Robert W. Meserve, President's Page, 59 A.B.A.
J. 803 (Aug. 1973).
224. United States v. Mitchell, 384 F. Supp. 562 (D.D.C. 1974); United States v.
Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239,1246-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
225. See R.W. Apple, Jr., Prologue to The Watergate Hearings-Break-in and
Coverup: Proceedings of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities 1, 1 (N.Y. Times staff eds., 1973) (stating that, when the hearings began in
May, 1973, "[t]he full import of the case had not yet been driven home to the
American people, particularly that vast segment of the population with the good
sense to occupy itself, most of the time, with things more edifying than the latest
hijinks in Washington").
226. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Richard M. Nixon, 360 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973).
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in law schools227 -that did generally occur after the full lawyer
involvement in the scandal had become clear 2 2 -but Standard 302(a)
itself was motivated much more by the burgeoning enrollments in law
schools in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and changes in who was
going to law school in that same period.229
C. Changes in Legal Ethics Instruction in Law Schools
Many law schools reacted to the new ABA standard by adding new
required courses in professional responsibility, and most of them were
teaching the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which had
been promulgated just a few years earlier.23' This was the beginning
of a new attention to legal ethics instruction that has continued to this
day.
Not until 1898, however, did a course in professional responsibility
appear in a law school, at Ohio State.23' Over the next two decades,
most law schools came to offer separate courses in the subject,
227. Beginning in the mid-1970s, while in college and working as a legal assistant
for a New York law firm, I heard many law students and recent graduates refer to
legal ethics courses as "Watergate courses."
228. Especially if 1970s and 1980s legal reforms are to be attacked as weak because
they were lame knee-jerk responses to the Watergate scandal, we should be careful
about seeing causal connections that may not exist upon closer scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Ayer, supra note 13, at 1809 ("[I]n the undertow of the Watergate scandal.., the
legal education establishment started slapping 'ethics' requirements on just about
everything: the law curriculum, the bar exam, the continuing education agenda, and
so forth."); Daly et al., supra note 9, at 194 ("In response to the Watergate scandal,
the ABA adopted Standard 302(a)(iii) in 1974."); Kissam, supra note 13, at 1984
("[Tihe Watergate affair aroused public and professional concerns about the ethical
behavior of lawyers, and the profession responded by establishing a professional
ethics part to state bar examinations and by requiring law schools to teach 'legal
ethics."').
229. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. Tellingly, the first published
commentary on the Watergate scandal from the President of the ABA appeared in
the July, 1973, issue of the ABA Journal-months after the ABA's approval of new
law school standards. See Robert W. Meserve, President's Page, 59 A.B.A. J. 681
(1973) (asserting that "[nlo one needs a course in ethics to know that burglary or
perjury is illegal and immoral"). In President Meserve's speech to the ABA at its
annual meeting in August, 1973, he focused on Watergate but made no mention at all
(of course) about any connection to the earlier adoption of the professional
responsibility requirement. See Robert W. Meserve, The Legal Profession and
Watergate, 59 A.B.A. J. 985 (1973). At that same meeting, the Assembly adopted a
resolution condemning "any action on the part of members of the legal profession
which might cast aspersions upon the integrity of the profession," a resolution that
was about Watergate but made no mention of it. See Watergate, Sex, and Marijuana
Dominate Debate at Washington August Meeting, 59 A.B.A. J. 1131-32 (1973).
230. Karger, supra note 102, at 11 (linking the MPRE's creation to the fact that
"the Code of Professional Responsibility was part of the curriculum of every ABA-
approved law school, as mandated by the ABA"); see also Letter from the Chairman,
45 Bar Examiner 3, 3 (1976) (attributing the NCBE's consideration of giving an ethics
exam to "this being a required course in some law schools and the growing number of
States that are testing on ethics").
231. Rhode, Pervasive Method, supra note 9, at 35.
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although instruction tended to take the form of lecture series by
lawyers or judges.232 Thus, while ethics was frequently taught in law
schools as the twentieth century rolled by, it was not taught very
much, or very well.233 Most observers concluded that ethics courses
were "unpopular and generally ineffective" '234 and that many law
schools had thereby "neglected to ground our students in legal ethics
and the professional responsibility of the lawyer." '235 As a California
bar official noted in 1953, effective "instruction in professional
responsibility is indeed one of the missing elements in legal
education." '236 Even the Chief Justice of the United States criticized
law schools in a 1972 speech for "fail[ing] to inculcate sufficiently the
necessity of high standards of professional ethics. 237
The first serious renewal of interest in instruction in professional
ethics in these dark times was instigated not by the organized bar, but
rather by law students. One important change in the demographics of
law students in the 1960s had nothing to do with race or gender and
everything to do with politics. Law students of the late 1960s were far
more politically active and reform-minded than their 1950s
counterparts.235 Many of them demanded curricular reforms that
would make legal education more relevant to such issues as poverty
and race relations.2 39 Enter clinical legal education and the Council on
Legal Education for Professional Responsibility ("CLEPR"), a
corporation founded in 1968 by the Ford Foundation to provide seed
money for such programs.24 While some schools had clinical programs
in the 1950s, it was CLEPR (and the Foundation's money) that greatly
broadened the scope of these programs, 24' giving 107 law schools a
232. Id.
233. Philbrick McCoy, The Law Student and Professional Standards: The Problem
of Teaching Legal Ethics, 40 A.B.A. J. 305, 305 (1954) (offering good summaries of
this history, from quite different perspectives); Rhode, Pervasive Method, supra note
9, at 35; Eugene F. Scoles, A Decade in the Development and Drafting of the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination, 59:2 Bar Examiner 20, 20-22 (1990).
234. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Five Functions of the Lawyer: Service to Clients and
the Public, 40 A.B.A. J. 31,32 (1954).
235. George Neff Stevens, Legal Education for Practice: What the Law Schools Can
Do and Are Doing, 40 A.B.A. J. 211,214 (1954).
236. Homer D. Crotty, Character and the Law Schools: Professional Conduct
Should Be Emphasized, 39 A.B.A. J. 385, 386 (1953).
237. Warren Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 Fordham L. Rev.
227, 232 (1973).
238. Laura G. Holland, Invading the Ivory Tower: The History of Clinical
Education at Yale Law School, 49 J. Legal Educ. 504, 514-15 (1999).
239. Packer & Erlich, supra note 209, at 37.
240. Holland, supra note 238, at 516.
241. See Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Learning Through Service in a Clinical Setting:
The Effect of Specialization on Social Justice and Skills Training, 7 Clinical L. Rev.
307, 312 (2001) (describing the development of the clinical program at the University
of New Mexico).
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total of $6.5 million in grants over a ten year period. 42 One scholar
called the rise in clinical legal education "[t]he most promising
development in the teaching of professional responsibility," because it
"has the potential to create young lawyers with a heightened sense of
the ethical dimensions of legal work. 243 Clinics offer something other
than classroom ethics instruction, to be sure, giving students the
ability to fulfill pro bono obligations while learning valuable lessons in
ethical lawyering.
24
Compared to the virtually unquestioned success of the clinical legal
education movement,245 the ABA's actions in the early 1970s to
require schools to offer instruction in professional responsibility was a
relative failure. 46 An informal study by Professors Cramton and
Koniak in 1995 showed that "a number of major law schools require
little or no instruction in legal ethics. '24 7 Their sad conclusion, that
legal ethics today occupies only a minor role in the law school
curriculum at many schools, appears irrefutable. 48 Still, the mid-1970s
increase in courses in professional responsibility, while neither
reaching all schools nor resulting in the allocation of adequate units
for them to be effective, helped support the creation of the MPRE.
Somewhat ironically, the MPRE may now be supporting the required
ethics course at many law schools. 49
While there is now great diversity in the way legal ethics is taught in
law schools, 2 °1 Standard 302(a)(iii), as amended in 1974 to require
242. Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 Clinical L. Rev. 19 (2001).
243. Papke, supra note 56, at 45.
244. See Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, "Johnny's in the Basement Mixing Up
His Medicine": Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 24 Seattle U. L. Rev.
339, 341 n.10 (2000); James E. Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law
Schools: Replacing Lost Benefits of the Apprentice System in the Academic
Atmosphere, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 83, 91-92 (1991); Stephen Wizner, The Law School
Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests of Justice, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1929, 1933
(2002).
245. See Stevens, Law School, supra note 70, at 240-41.
246. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most
Important Subject in Law School, 29 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 719 (1998) (discussing the failed
promises of lofty rhetoric about instilling high ethical standards); Subha Dhanaraj,
Comment, Making Lawyers Good People: Possibility or Pipedream?, 28 Fordham
Urb. L. J. 2037 (2001) (examining the law schools' failure to inculcate lawyers with a
sense of moral responsibility).
247. Cramton & Koniak, supra note 9, at 147 n.14.
248. Id. at 147-48.
249. See Morrissey, supra note 7, at 5 ("The widespread acceptance of the
examination has triggered a greater demand for teaching in this critical area."); see
also The Law School Dean Looks at the Bar Examination and the Examiner: A Panel
Discussion, 31 Bar Examiner 99, 100 (1966) (remarks of Eugene V. Rostow)
(commenting on the fact that the "scope of the bar examination has its effect not only
on curriculum committees in law school but also on the students' election of courses,"
calling it "part of our system of checks and balances"). For complaints about this
phenomenon, see supra note 9.
250. Articles appear regularly in the Journal of Legal Education and the Journal of
the Legal Profession, among other places. Law review symposia on this topic include
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instruction in the Model Code, undoubtedly influenced the teaching
of professional responsibility in the direction of having more of a
national, unified, doctrinal focus.25 ' That movement pointed the way,
along with the other developments discussed in this article, to the
creation of the MPRE.
CONCLUSION
While some normative criticism of the MPRE undoubtedly has
merit, the test has been largely either ignored or trivialized by most
outside the ranks of the bar examiners themselves. When the exam is
seen in the context of the broader forces that created and sustain it,
however, its historical significance becomes evident. It was far more
than a superficial attempt to respond to Watergate or to any other
short-lived crisis or trend. Rather, a long look backward shows the
exam as an important product of a much older movement towards the
national standardization of the rules of professional responsibility for
lawyers, of bar admission requirements, and of legal education's
treatment of legal ethics. It is likely these currents and the attitudes
that feed them, more than the ripples of particular lawyer scandals,
that will shape the future of bar exam testing on professional
responsibility.
Admittedly, the MPRE is and always will be a limited test252-far
too limited by its very format to stand as a "comprehensive" national
examination in legal ethics or the law of lawyering. Passing the test
does not signal that the successful examinee will be an ethical
practitioner; "The most unethical individual in the world can study the
Code and tell you what it is they are not supposed to do." '253
Recognizing its limits should simply spark ideas for augmenting it with
some other, less rule-based forms of evaluation of bar applicants and
instruction of practicing lawyers. For example, more states should test
38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (1996) and 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (1995).
251. The adoption of the Model Rules reinforced this tendency. Students can leave
a course in professional responsibility without any grasp of their home state's rules
and laws, just as they can leave any other course that way, but they usually know the
ABA's models. Students in Nebraska learn the same general body of legal ethics
"law" as students in New Jersey or Georgia, just as they do in torts or contracts or
criminal law. Although the MPRE admittedly reinforces this phenomenon by testing
on that same uniform national material, it is the existence of the rules themselves, not
the test, that leads some students to believe that legal ethics begins and ends with
those rules. See Cramton & Koniak, supra note 9, at 172-76 (stressing the
fundamental error of such a narrow view of ethics).
252. Bar exams in general test competence in only a limited way. As the Chief
Justice of Nebraska said over twenty years ago, "the only thing that a bar examination
can really test, upon graduation, is an individual's ability to analyze and his or her
knowledge of the then substantive law. That is all that it can possibly do." Bar
Admissions, Development and Problems, 50:1 Bar Examiner 36, 41 (1981) (address of
Hon. Norman Krivosha).
253. Id. at 42.
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professional responsibility issues on the essay254 and performance
parts of the bar exam, and meaningful continuing education courses
should continue to be developed. 5
Undoubtedly, the NCBE and the organized bar-with or without
the help of legal academics who are not already formally involved
with either 25 --will continue to work to improve the test's coverage
and methodology. As the underlying form or scope of the rules and
the law of lawyering change, the exam too will change. As
perceptions evolve about what is important and what is not, the exam
will change to reflect those perceptions. As we learn even more about
the science of testing, the exam will reflect that new learning. 257 The
MPRE may well outlive many of us now teaching legal ethics. Its true
origins lie in strong historical forces and practical considerations,
which through the years have only become more pronounced.
254. See Logan, supra note 15, at 1024, 1031-32 (making the same
recommendation). California currently tests professional responsibility on its essay
exam; it did so, for example, in February, 2001. That question was largely doctrinal,
focusing on advertising and solicitation and the use of nonlawyer assistants. State Bar
of California, California Bar Examination, Essay and Performance Test Subject
Coverage (Feb. 2001).
255. California also led the way with mandatory continuing education courses in
legal ethics. See Diane C. Yu, The Role of the Bar Association, in The MacCrate
Report: Conference Proceedings 111, 112-13 (1993).
256. Academics are getting more involved. The AALS Committee on Bar
Admission and Lawyer Performance conducted a study in 2001 of the extent to which
law schools prepare students directly for the bar exam. In the summer of 2002,
representatives of the AALS, the ABA and the NCBE met to consider creating a
"Joint Working Group on Legal Education and Bar Admission," which would, among
other things, draft a statement of recommended standards for law schools'
involvement in the bar admission process. Dale Whitman, Thinking About Bar
Admissions, AALS Newsletter, Aug. 2002, at 4.
257. The MPRE was developed with the help of testing professionals from ACT.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text. A growing body of scholarship in the legal
journals focuses on testing science, making that field more accessible to legal
academics than it used to be. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Grosberg, Should We Test for
Interpersonal Lawyering Skills?, 2 Clinical L. Rev. 349 (1996); Lisa Kelly, Yearning
for Lake Wobegon: The Quest for the Best Test at the Expense of the Best Education, 7
S. Cal. Interdiscip. L. J. 41 (1998).
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